‘Increased tension could threaten Russia’ as Putin tries to hide Dagestan unrest | Nicole Wolkov

‘Increased tension could threaten Russia’ as Putin tries to hide Dagestan unrest | Nicole Wolkov

clearly because of the attack in dagistan Russian Security Forces haven’t been able to completely eradicate that threat um and are very seem very unwilling with in public statements to actually acknowledge that there is a domestic terrorism threat within Russia because they continue to posture this um very stable and normal society uh and continually promote um the sort of inter ethnic interreligious Harmony um without recognizing that there is a a a legitimate um islamist uh extremist threat within Russia hello and welcome to Frontline for times radio I’m James Hansen and today we’re talking about the latest on the war in Ukraine and I’m delighted to be joined by Nicole wov a Russia researcher at The Institute for the study of War Nicole really appreciate your time thank you for joining us today on front line Thank you for having me uh in the isws La his campaign assessment you talk about Vladimir Putin’s theory of Victory being based on Russia making creeping advances in Ukraine almost indefinitely can you just expand a bit on that for us sure so Putin articulated this theory of victory in early June at the St Petersburg economic forum and so he assessed basically that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely uh likely at the you know current tempo of operations and this would prevent Ukraine from conducting any sort of significant successful um counteroffensive operations uh and that through this slow creeping advances and War of Attrition Russia could eventually be victorious in Ukraine that’s interesting because we we do often hear talk about Putin almost wanting to create a a forever war in Ukraine is is this almost part of that so I think there’s a couple different aspects here so he wants to protract the war because protracting the war would likely um give Russia the time to reconstitute rest its forces um you know continue to mobilize its defense industrial base so it’s continuing these creeping advances to do that as well as to also maintain the initiative so Putin has likely assessed that it’s imperative for Russian forces to maintain the initiative on the battlefield and throughout the theater in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from making any sort of um advances or conduct any sort of operationally significant counter offensive so this um this protraction of the war would help that but at the same time um Putin has uh you know falsely signaled um interest in um negotiating a ceasefire uh currently he is not interested in this but isw continues to assess that such you know a ceasefire would also you know in a way protract the war because it wouldn’t end it and it would um establish the further precedent uh for Russia to you use this time to reconstitute build up its defense industrial base to then in the future pursue the destruction of Ukraine and is also one of his incentives when it comes to protracting this war the hope that if it drags on Western support for Ukraine will begin to drop off absolutely so this whole assumption is based on the idea that uh Putin and Russia can Outlast uh Western resolve so you know Western political military uh uh security support for Ukraine and can they outlaw I mean speaking now I mean obviously they’re trying to build up their military industrial base in Russia but but maybe from an economic point of view as well can Russia Outlast the West has it got the capacity to to keep this war dragging on for years and years and years so Putin has uh signaled uh some economic reforms recently um including adjusting the tax codes and part of this is likely to uh more easily integrate the economy with the Russian war effort so he is making taking these steps um to better have the Russian economy serve the Russian war effort likely in an effort to maintain this protracted to attempt to maintain the protracted War that’s really interesting just just tell us a bit more about the changes he’s made to tax he increased taxes or has he just sort of done a bit of you know changes around the edges that that that increase Revenue so he has um suggested a more graduated tax system for uh Russians over um a certain income and the uh Russian uh of Russian government has suggested that this would um increase uh a revenue as well as um and and there’s also like an informational aspect of this of course because it’s only for people over certain income right this is also an effort to kind of include more people into this war effort so kind of signaling that everyone in society must take on this burden there’s surely a risk there though I mean if you are making people quite literally pay for your war in Ukraine and pay more for your war in Ukraine presumably there are internal political risks for Putin by doing that of course um but I think at this current time the changes aren’t drastic enough to uh see um incredible uh push back against that um and we have seen that the you know Russian Elites and oligarchs have largely um fallen behind Putin in and come to heal in supporting the war or at least not um outwardly expressing criticism of it and it’s interesting Nicole you say in your your latest campaign assessment for the isw that the part of Putin’s strategy is you know his determination to undermine any notion of Ukrainian sovereignty and nationhood Ju Just tell us a bit more about about that so Putin has routinely stated that um he does not believe Ukraine to be um an independent sovereign country nor Ukrainian identity culture language peoplehood to uh be legitimate which is all false so he’s routinely stated that as well as his um stated and implied territorial goals also um would completely um violate Ukrainian territorial Integrity he has previously stated that he wants all of the administrative boundaries of Lans kabia denet uh and hon oblasts uh even the parts that he does not occupy as well as obviously Crema um but he’s also routinely um implied that um and made reference to um wanting go uh territory outside of those specific regions um and other Russian officials have stated the same uh because this goes back to uh his his routine um reiteration of pseudo history of false history that uh Ukraine is not a state I wanted to ask you Nicole about events recently in dagistan the Russian Republic of course and the caucuses were a week on from a from a major terrorist attack there and it’s the second major terrorist attack in in Russia within just three months we remember the attack on the outskirts of Moscow at the concerto A few months back how big a worry is internal security and domestic terrorism for Vladimir Putin at the moment so it’s clear that after the cro City Hall attack in March um Russian authorities were definitely worried about increased terrorism uh given that they uh you know started to take meas signal to take measures on um being more uh forceful against migrants uh as well as um they made Illusions to uh you know in diplomatic meetings working with um Central Asian countries like Tajikistan um specifically to combat different threats from Afghanistan um but while that may be ongoing clearly because of the attack in dagistan Russian Security Forces haven’t been able to completely eradicate that threat um and are very seem very unwilling with in public statements to actually acknowledge that there is a domestic terrorism threat within Russia because they continue to posture this um very stable and normal society uh and continually promote um the sort of inter ethnic interreligious Harmony um without recognizing that there is a a a legitimate um islamist uh extremist threat within Russia and it was interesting after the attack of the kroer city hall in in Moscow Putin baselessly asserting that that Ukraine had some sort of culpability with with no evidence obviously have we seen something similar in the wake of the attack in in dagistan so not to the same extent so obviously we saw you know at the highest levels including Putin you know accus Ukraine basicly of you know committing the crocus City Hall attack but uh for this dogistan attack um it’s much more uh a subtle much more subtle effort there there have been of Russian officials who have blamed Ukraine but not to the same level level um you know of Putin or the cabinet for example but there have been efforts to link the two and you know uh for for example uh tie uh different events uh taking place in the war with the attack U simply because they took place during a certain time frame and so all of these are more subtle attempts uh to condition uh you know Russian Society into linking the war with dastan and then inadvertently blaming Ukraine and ethnic minorities in regions such as dagistan have been disproportionately mobilized since the start of the war has that added to the tensions there so we have seen increasing tension especially um against migrants and so obviously these are usually people from the South Caucasus and Central Asia coming to work in Russia and these are not Russian citizens although they um do um sometimes get Russian citizenship but what we’ve seen now and you know these people often get criticized and discriminated against what we’ve seen now is this shift of um these Russian Ultra nationalists that support the war lumping together Uh Russian citizens who are Muslim with these migrants so now they’re starting to blur the lines of uh who they see as a threat of you know indigenous you know Russian ethnic minorities who happen to be Muslim and now are um lumping them in with you know what who who they deem as threats of migrants and were the tensions in the caucuses to to spill over again as as we’ve seen over the years in places like ccher and other places you know how much of an internal concern is that for Putin and could that potentially undermine his war effort in Ukraine I think that’s a very hard question and um we have seen that uh specifically uh you know Chan leader kadirov has been um helping in the war effort since the start and has um been been leveraged for mobilization efforts and also his forces have been participating in the war so um a so increased tension could definitely uh threaten the internal situation in in Russia at a time when Russia needs Unity behind this war effort this is probably hard to answer but I’ll just ask you just in case you’re in a position to comment on it that there was speculation a few months ago that kadirov was was seriously ill and may not be around for too much longer and if he’s out of the equation what does that mean for for for the region in particular in cheter if do you know anything on that we we’ve seen multiple times um speculation of kadir’s Health So speculations within the Russian information space regarding his well-being are a frequent um and you know certain actors like to in the information space really you know are sort of conspiratorial about the whole thing um but it it is you know we continue to monitor who uh kadirov is um trying to uh Elevate to his as his Su successor as um in in recent days it’s it’s recent months it’s been um more unclear which uh of his older Sons he’s interested in promoting that’s really interesting and and I suppose the issue of his health is is so hard to comment on because getting any accurate information is very difficult bit like these rumors we’ have we’ve had over the years about Vladimir Putin’s Health but but you know we will watch we will watch that space I want to come on to the situation with Ukraine itself president zalinsky is renewed as call for more longrange weapons and and air defenses after last week’s Russian attack on the town of bans which killed at least seven people including Ally to Children how severe Nicole is the Ukrainian shortage in air defenses at the moment so like I said in my um previous statement um isw does not assess on Ukrainian capabilities or intent but um the situation with um air defense you know Ukrainian officials have vo that it is incredibly important that um that and Ukraine needs more um air defense uh systems as well as interceptors and this is incredibly important for Ukraine’s ability to not only defend its civilians and its energy infrastructure and um you know other critical infrastructure but also to um adequately repel Russian attacks so um you know we’ve I’m I’m sure you’ve seen all the discussion about uh you know intercepting um military aircraft or being able to strike um legitimate Russian military targets within Russia that are targeting uh you know targeting areas in Ukraine and so air defense remains um incredibly important to be able to repel those attacks as well as to then also protect Ukrainian forces um to protect Ukrainian Ground Forces when they conduct operations and and are we seeing the impact of the lacis round of us military aid already being felt on the front line I mean obviously that there is talk about you know some of it still being delivered not all of it can be used yet but but a lot of it has now arrived are we starting to see an impact so Ukrainian officials have signaled that um some um some military aid has arrived in Ukraine um I think they’ve mostly signaled um ammunition but and some Ukrainian forces or some some Ukrainian officials have acknowledged also that is helped reduce uh the ratio of the Russian advantage of um ammunition however Russian Russians still they have signal that Russians do still have the advantage I think it’s about five or six to one so while it’s helped to reduce by no means has it you know actually um challenged Russia’s artillery Advantage um and it will likely Ukraine officials have signal that’ll likely take time weeks if not several months for um the significant amounts of Aid to arrive and um Russian forces during this time will definitely attempt to exploit still these uh disadvantages to make tactically and operationally significant gains on the front line and um so this is why it’s incredibly important that um the West uh which and it is responsibility for the West to move significant amount of you know military security Aid to Ukraine um in a timely fashion well let’s talk about Russia and what we’re seeing on the ground at the moment um where do they seem to be focusing most of their resources on the front line in Ukraine currently Russian forces are currently attacking in eastern Ukraine specifically focusing on D obas so we’ve seen the creeping gains near AA and then also west and southwest of D city so we continue to assess that the Russian offensive operations in Northern hardke OAS continue to be this fixing operation in that area to attempt to draw Ukrainian forces away from the critical sectors in denas SK blast so you know Russian attempts to seize chivar um as well as abiva and and how much progress have have Russia been making in harv oblast in in recent weeks has the offensive stoer somewhat yes so the tempo of Russian offensive operations slowed dramatically um at the very beginning um and we’ve seen uh within the past week or so that Ukrainian forces have been able to make um tactical gains actually in the area um but Russian forces did not uh the Russian military did not commit you know significant Russian forces to the the heartkey area um suggesting right that they don’t see it as a a prioritized effort but rather a fixing operation uh so the the tempo has has slowed um incredibly there Nicole really appreciate your time and your Insight and your analysis thank you for joining us today on Frontline thank you thank you for watching Frontline for times radio for more click subscribe on our YouTube channel you can listen to times radio and you can read more about the war in Ukraine and global security with your times digital subscription

“Increased tension could definitely threaten the internal situation in Russia at a time when Russia needs unity behind this war effort.”

Putin’s FSB has sought to deny and play down internal security threats within Russia, and distract with the war in Ukraine, despite increasing terror attacks linked to the Dagestan region, Nicole Walkov from @UnderstandingWarOrg tells Frontline.

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