How the war in Ukraine turned into a ‘strategic catastrophe’ for Putin | James Heappey

How the war in Ukraine turned into a ‘strategic catastrophe’ for Putin | James Heappey

what’s the theory of Victory or absent that what is the theory of defeat for Putin well if Putin’s initial strategic aim was to go to war to invade Ukraine to deny Ukraine to Nato an utter fallacy but that was his strategic aim then saying to him NATO is going to be in the rump of Ukraine whether you like it or not because we’ll guarantee the security of whatever Ukraine is post this war that’s that’s his strategic defeat alongside Finland and Sweden seeding to the alliance you know what utter catastrophe at the Strategic level utter catastrophe for Putin and so my view is that you know that the offer should be made now at Washington what an amazing thing for the 75th um anniversary Summit to achieve but I don’t think it will hello and welcome to front line for times radio with me K chabo and this time we’re speaking to James heape who was armed forces Minister for four years in the UK until March 2024 he was a British infantry officer for 10 years in the Army and served in Northern Ireland Iraq and Afghanistan and he’s just joined CH times radio to host superpowers a series on geopolitics and the future of defense and security James heape uh welcome to Front Line good to have you on the program thanks having me Kate in your career you’ve had the chance to see conflict from two different and unique perspectives as a soldier and as a defense minister now you can examine it from the outside what’s your overall assessment of today’s Global Security threats and what concerns you the most so I I’m filled with Dread um you you’re right that many people would say that the time that I was in the British army uh was an incredibly dangerous time and if you look at the body count and former colleagues who are now walking around without limbs um that would be that would be born out and similarly for our American cousins too but all of that was to a degree discretionary it was you know it was a there were wars fought thousands of miles away in response to terrorism uh rather than the existential threat that exists with the prospect of state onst state war and peer on peer War more importantly um and so you know we When I visit um units in the British Armed Forces now they often lament that they’re not as busy as the Afghan is the Iraq is they kind of look back at that as being some sort of housian days when young men and women got to prove themselves in combat and of course that’s what militaries are are all about but actually seeing Western militaries pivot back to Conventional deterrence being ready for fullon high octane State on state conflict is pretty sobering and means in my view serving in the British military or the militaries of our allies now is far more demanding than it was for my generation in Iraq and Afghanistan because what they’re preparing for is war um not the counterinsurgency operations that that I fought in and specifically on the war in Ukraine the Ukraine at the UK really took a lead in delivering weapons after the invasion in 2022 and you considered it a bold and early move to send nlaw anti-tank weapons were those decisions straightforward or was it a very complicated process uh no they definitely weren’t straightforward uh it took Ben Wallace at his belligerent best to uh RAM that decision through uh various committees at the heart of the UK government yeah and and I you know um I hope that when the history is written Ben is credited with with being as bold as he as he was and as persistent as he needed to be the people who are on the other side of the argument are not in the wrong that’s the necessary tension that should exist within government and it was you know it was right to worry about what the kind of escalation risk was and whether or not we became a party to the conflict as a consequence of those donations um so no it definitely was wasn’t a straightforward decision similarly it it wasn’t a straightforward decision every time that we then went on and went through the next capability thresold whether that was providing um glms the kind of Rocket artillery that that followed enw or Javelin um and then into sort of uh Heavy Artillery tanks armored fighting Vehicles you know and so on and so forth you know all of those all of those steps up in capability have always brought with them Fierce debate at the heart of government but but in many ways I think your your viewers listeners would be reassured to know that that’s the case you know uh government should neither be um unnecessarily wet but nor should it be gung-ho and you know having real scrutiny around every decision was very necessary um albeit in the end theod was right you believe that in the early stages the West achieved what you describe as escalation dominance over president Putin what is escalation dominance exactly and what effect did it have well I think that when Putin was sat there in the winter of 2021 into 2022 with zapad the exercise that was the kind of the cover for the invasion Force assembling um I think he would have reflected on the West’s lack of response to the Crimea uh Invasion 10 years prior um and also the West’s incision Over Georgia uh lack of commitment to what’s going on in mova um to to other conflicts in the caucuses and I think he felt that and Syria I suppose as well um and I suspect he felt I know he felt that that that that indecision that kind of um um that over overly nuanced way of Western thinking in our multinational fora would paralyze us once again and therefore all he need he would always have the opportunity to be more aggressive in his language be more aggressive in his military intent and in his view that would always put the West off its stride and you know and and do nothing so I I think the fact that we got out in front of him and it started with the willingness to declassify highly sensitive intelligence and call out some of the Russian false flag operations I think that really surprised him at the the US intelligence community’s willingness to do that they are normally much more cautious with the way that they share that grade of intelligence um and then the fact that capability capability started flowing uh Western rhetoric was not uh overly nuanced it was very very clear that Putin must fail and be seen to fail this all ends on zelinsky’s terms as long as it takes whatever it takes all that sort of language will have surprised Putin and I think for the first year and all the way through to the successful um Ukrainian counter offens of the Autumn of 2022 when the Haro blast was largely retaken I I think Putin was was surprising and and the sort of consequence of that within the Russian system was the Vagner uh attempted coup um I I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the West has lost the initiative since but I think that that early escalation dominance probably isn’t um hasn’t been maintained and why is that uh hard to say uh I think uh I think Western politics plays A Part there’s been a change in prime minister here in the UK and I I don’t for a second want to imply that Rishi is any less committed to it than Ben and Liz but sorry than Boris and Liz but I think Boris and Liz had a much more strident language that they deployed o over Ukraine um I think that macron’s political landscape has changed significantly um although you know he’s made some pretty pretty bold announcements only in the last of three four months but but that’s changing and then the US the US have always um being more cautious you know the kind of primary instruction that I think the president of the United States has given to those working on this problem in Washington is just don’t get the us into a third world war but then people who criticize the US for not doing enough are talking a nonsence with the US are by far and away the largest donor um and even if they’ve not been the first to go through each capability threshold when they’ve gone through it they’ve gone through it in a way which kind of says to people like me hold my beer because it’s just huge in the in the sort of volume of stuff that they give there after but I think we’ve the politics has changed the amount of stuff that exists within our inventories that can just be handed over is diminished to the point of no longer uh because we’ve kind of given everything that we had spare already industry is cranking into gear but it will take some time so I think there’s just a natural natural plateauing for a number of reasons Putin should take no heart from that because I think once a lot of these new Once the new factories manufacturing 155 ammunition are up at full speed that is a guaranteed steady supply of heavy am artillery ammunition for the ukrainians once all these drone factories are up and running that’s a Guaranteed Supply of drones for the ukrainians so the Western industrial base is mobilizing that will take some time um we just need to make sure that we’re very clear in our political intent in the meantime so that Putin doesn’t take the games up and and in the meantime uh you could for example uh change the permissions on the use of Western supplied weapons president zelinski is demanding that F further relaxation of those restrictions on targeting Russia points to 800 Glide Bonds in a single week should um Ukraine be allowed to Target the air drones inside Russia with longrange missiles to stop the aircraft that carry those Glide bombs that are causing so much damage in Ukraine so in my view yes um but I I said that you know early Daws when we’ first given um mlrs you know the rocket artillery that had a sort of range of 150 kilometers or so I was asked when I was somewhere in Eastern Europe whether or not those could be used to Target the targets inside Russia and I said of course they can I mean I think providing their legitimate military targets that are being engaged to disrupt the Russian Logistics and command and control networks that are supporting the front line then of course they should be they should be engaged now I was um gently told that um that I was probably writing checks that my level of ministerial office had no authority to write um but I I think we’ve moved a long way since then and and what you what you see is that you the Russians aren’t fools okay every time that there has has been an evolution in Ukrainian capability through the latest round of gifting the Russians have revised where they site their headquarters they’ve revised where they site their their Logistics nodes now that makes the Russian army quite brittle because they’ve got extended lines of communication between their rear echelons and their forward fighting echelons um but the fact is is that we could if we gave the ukrainians the permissions they seek push that Russian command and control and those Russian logistic nodes even further rearwards and in the process make their supply lines even more brittle still I suppose that that the the fear might be uh that that Ukraine may be tempted rather than just preventing immediate threat of Russian advances to actually harm Putin and Putin’s Russia itself yeah and I think that and and there in sits exactly uh the Dilemma that people like J Sullivan Tim Barrow would find themselves in if you were to be a fly on the wall in their offices when these sorts of issues are discussed um you know that there is no doubt that militarily the more that you can stretch Russia’s Logistics uh their supply lines their command and control networks the more militarily advantageous that is but there is also this reality that um you know you’ve got to balance that against what if the ukrainians then targeted beyond that they went for something that had more political impact rather than military impact what would be the consequence of that in terms of the way that Russia would um respond to a perceived Western involvement now goes back to the earlier conversation about escalation dominance even if we have nothing to do with it even if nothing happens the Russians will always say that the West is doing this the West is Mal the West is trying to defeat Russia and you know this is this is sort of some sort of Western imperialism so that narrative is always going to come from the Russians and we have to therefore make sure that we’re not deterred by the rhetoric that they were always going to use but you know easy for people like me that are you know former ministers former soldiers now in the commentariat to say of course we should National Security advisers when advising their Prime Ministers and presidents have to have regard for for a wider set of consequences we we just had the second anniversary of operation interflex the training of Ukrainian troops in the UK what what could in your view a full-on western training Mission inside Ukraine achieved that can’t be done from outside the country uh formation Level Training I I I just think it’s I think that we can uh around Europe easily do individual Battlefield casualty Replacements too easy you know we’ve been doing it in enormously successful through interflex for the last two years and how much of a difference could that make well I mean I think it’s made an enormous difference I it’s given you the evidence is that the troops that have enjoyed the training provided by the UK or our partners all around Europe and America has been obviously training people in in in in Europe too uh so to allies from Far a field who have New Zealand Australia Canada who have sent trainers to um to be part of it too um those troops have arrived at the front line with a better chance of surviving and a better chance of succeeding but they’re but they’ve been trained as individuals um the battle group or the company group and battle group Level Training as limited as it has been you know is broadly successful what it it’s been mostly around integrating new Western NATO standard equipment into the Ukrainian Force but what what we’ve not done yet and there’s and there’s a there’s a sort of practical reason for this is we’ve not trained at Brigade and divisional level and that’s just simply the logistics of bringing an entire Ukrainian Brigade out of the line and sending it A Thousand Miles rearwards Stand Fast whether Romania Poland Germany or anybody else would want to host that scale of Ukrainian training in their country it’s be an incredible Target for the Russians um so I just think that if we’re to complete this journey and I do think people have to have in their minds the journey that the Allies went on between 1940 and 1944 the kind of you know the between the The Retreat from Continental Europe at Dunkirk through to the Normandy Landings it takes a really long time and an incredible amount of effort to turn a volunteer second Echelon Force into a professional Army capable of doing an invasion or a reinvasion um so the Western Mission as brilliant as interflex has been has to now transform into a focus on generating Brigade and divisional level maneuver and how that is coordinated with air support Precision fires so artillery and missile strikes so that it is an overwhelming synchronized effect exactly as NATO would fight but to do that probably that’s going to require a western training mission in Western Ukraine generating Manpower is also a huge problem at the moment I’m just wondering what you’re from as speaking as a a former Soldier interested in your perspective about uh the news that’s being reported of the recruitment of convicts uh from prisons by Ukraine well um need must right I mean I I I mean I’ll say that I was as critical I’ll be as critical of that as in Principle as I was of of the Russians but I do think that when you’re um when you’re fighting for the very existence of your nation you make decisions that probably sit uneasily with you liberal cists like me but are are what is necessary to to keep fighting I I I also think that you know it’s not quite the question question you’re asking but um you zalinski has been racked over the decision about how far into his population to extend mobilization um and I think that uh you know there ultimately is no other option and I appreciate that this is incredibly difficult for the Ukrainian Nation who don’t want to sacrifice its youth its future uh in order that they are there to rebuild the country when the time comes but barely six months ago the average age on the front lines for the Ukrainian forces was about my age kind of early 40s um and that’s not sustainable you know if you’re fighting for your very existence as a nation you do need to mobilize everybody now prisoners sits ill with someone like me but needs must but I think that that mobilization needs to extend further and you know increasingly younger Ukrainian men and women need to be called upon the uh the NATO Summit is fast approaching in Washington 75th anniversary of NATO what do you think it can do as an alliance to be more assertive to stand up to Russia um speak with one voice whilst offering something very bold to the ukrainians but I am incredibly aware that that might be contradictory that you know and that was kind of what was flushed out at vness I would suggest that you know part of the alliance the sort of Eastern and northern European part of the alliance that wanted to be stronger in an offer to Ukraine push that so hard that it meant that the summit appeared to not have unanimity um in its view uh and arguably strategically that was that was more damaging than the strength of the offer was made to that was made to Ukraine so I suspect that the sort of sherpers uh the sort of officials that will have been running backwards and forwards between their capitals and Washington over the last uh few weeks preparing the ground for the summit will have been torn between the necessity of a summit that showed complete agreement and unanimous agreement around the future of NATO bearing in mind that the audience for that is not not just Putin but the Republican National Convention that follows a week later um versus the need for the conference to have some teeth um in its offer to Ukraine um if you ask me to put some money on I’m afraid I think that what we might see is a relatively timid Summit statement but one that prioritizes you know the sort of the the the consensus of the alliance so that so that there’s no there’s no weakness in the alliance shown to either Putin or Trump um in in the runup to their convention or or or or Putin watching on from afar thinking that that NATO risks fracture in and is obviously not not likely to be any offer to join NATO um to Ukraine and president L at following this conference zilinsky says though that um if if that fails to happen as as expected that its physical security must be offered by NATO and it’s asking for all the weapons it needs it’s asking for Patriot anti-missile system substantial number of f-16s the opportunity to use those weapons inside Russia I mean are NATO allies doing enough there so my view is that the NATO offer to Ukraine should come now you know if I was uh if I was still in government that’s what I would be advocating pretty forcefully um and uh you know and that would have required an incredible amount of uh diplomatic work uh and I think in Berlin and even in Washington that would have not been um a particularly easy argument to make but the way I see it is that there are there are only three outcomes to the war in Ukraine broadly one is that um Russia wins you know complete Russian success uh lots more territory taken well the consequence of that is that NATO has to rapidly rearm and take a position on the border of what was Ukraine um anticipating that a uh Victorious embolden Putin would be ready to take another bite out of NATO territory um shortly thereafter so that’s outcome number one requires the alliance to be even stronger longer outcome number two is that this stale or mate endures uh Trump uh either Trump negotiates something that requires ter that demands territorial compromise or the just it will Peters out in stalemate but if that happens there NATO definitely ends up guaranteeing the security of the rump of Ukraine whatever I mean by default that’s what ends up happening or um you Ukraine is in is utterly successful drives the Russians out uh and peace and Harmony breaks out forever more in which case brilliant um but those first two options are the more likely probably the stalemate the most likely of them all and NATO ends up being pivotal to what comes next so I just don’t I don’t see why if that’s where we know this ends up Landing in all public ility why we don’t make the offer to Ukraine sooner um and and and and that that brings with it you know if you one of the on the conference circuit people love to kind of talk about you know what is what’s the sort of what’s the theory of Victory or absent that what is the theory of defeat for Putin well if Putin’s initial strategic aim was to go to war to invade Ukraine to deny Ukraine to Nato an utter fallacy but that was his strategic aim then saying to him NATO is going to be in the rump of Ukraine whether you like it or not because we’ll guarantee the security of whatever Ukraine is post this war that’s that’s his strategic defeat alongside Finland and Sweden seeding to the alliance you know what utter catastrophe at the Strategic level utter catastrophe for Putin and so my view is that you know that the offer should be made now at Washington what an amazing thing for the 75th um anniversary Summits to achieve but I don’t think it will it just seems incredible when you lay it out it makes so much sense that it doesn’t happen if it doesn’t you I that’s why people should tune into to superpowers for latest ins nice plug there James actually on that note I’m just wondering um what are the questions and the issues you really want to get to the bottom of look so I um the Ukraine war is just the start of it right uh we are amazingly in a century where all of a sudden autocratic leaders think that it is okay to take territory off their neighbors or to launch as we saw Teran do two months ago to Launch complex allout air attacks against another another country um she postures endlessly over uh taking Taiwan by force but even if he doesn’t do that he uh Putin um the Ayatollah they are committed to challenging a world order that has I would argue kept the world pretty safe pretty secure and increasingly prosperous over the last 70 80 years um so you know the the the sort of daytoday tactical successes or otherwise of the Russians and the ukrainians in Ukraine hugely important it is the fight that is in front of us right now but needs to be set in the context of a competition over the future of the world order and in who interest that is constructed um a competition for resources and a changing competition for resources you the competition of the Industrial Age was over access to oil and gas and the things that underpin sovereignty in the Industrial Age in the digital age that competition is over a different set of resources China is Miles Ahead of the West in securing access to those resources and using debt as leverage over the governments that preside over where those resources are in order to solidify its position um the sort of the the the blending of transnational crime um religious fundamental uh fundamentalism that ver that crosses into terrorism and Insurgency with the state threats you see all of this kind of becoming increasingly interconnected add to that the subversion that is so widespread now in all Western democracies sponsored by Russia China and Iran in order to undermine our domestic um public discourse uh I think we live in incredibly challenging times for which the answer is not just military it’s political it’s economic it’s diplomatic um and you know that that that fascinates me it scares me um and you know I think that the more that we’re talking about it and the more that Western publics become aware of the nature of the compet the necessity to get behind our governments of whatever political color and push them to compete internationally for the British interest that’s that’s um that’s hugely important and and every bit as important as any domestic concern James he it’s been great talking to you thank you for your time just tell us where can we see your program superpowers uh on the same uh YouTube channel as you’re watching the brilliant Frontline uh and um it’s um and you know there’s there’s so much going on in the world that there’s more than enough room for two times radio programs looking at defense geopolitics War security uh and um you know I hope that your viewers will come and have a look at us and our viewers will continue to to watch the brilliant work that you do on front line James great to speak to you thank you so much all the best thanks you’ve been watching Frontline for times radio my thanks to Lou Sykes our producer to support the work off front line hit the Subscribe button you can also listen to times radio throughout the day or read it at times.co.uk thanks for watching bye-bye

” NATO ends up being pivotal to what comes next.”

The upcoming NATO summit could be used to give Ukraine the assurance it needs to end the war, James Heappey tells Kate Gerbeau on Frontline
—
📻 Listen to Times Radio – https://www.thetimes.co.uk/radio

📍 Subscribe to our channel – http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCTjDhFuGXlhx9Us0gq0VK2w?sub_confirmation=1

🗞 Subscribe to The Times https://www.thetimes.co.uk/subscribe/radio-3for3/

📲 Get the free Times Radio app https://www.thetimes.co.uk/radio/how-to-listen-to-times-radio/app