Losses of the Russian military to 13.9.2024



Losses of the Russian military to 13.9.2024

by MARTINELECA

16 comments
  1. 17 000 enemy APC liquidation mark reached, though this category seems to have gained on artillery lately, is this because of the more mobile nature of the combat in Kursk?

  2. Ladies and gentlemen, Russia has officially lost 17,000 AFVs in battle.

    Our bot has a few words to say. Bot, what can you tell us about the poetically pathetic Russian leadership?

  3. I am really, really hoping that this is getting to the point where Moscow genuinely cannot replace artillery systems from stockpiles as fast as they’re getting destroyed. Russia sans artillery does not have enough drones to make up the difference.

  4. At this point, I would expect a noticeable decrease in activity and Russian progress. Otherwise, it’s quite likely that these numbers include damaged rather than only destroyed

  5. Last time I saw this it was 600.000 men. I can’t wrap my head to 30k people diying on a life eye blink, putin really hates his own more than his enemies.

  6. Greetings from Ukraine!

    On the front lines, the number of Russian army attacks has decreased, but very intense battles are ongoing in the main directions of advance.

    – Interesting, if not confusing, reports are coming from the Kursk Oblast area. On one hand, Russian sources report that the Russian army has launched an offensive south from the village of Kornevo. Additionally, part of the Russian units have crossed the Seim River and are attacking Ukrainian forces in the Glushkovo area. Other Russian sources report that Ukrainian forces have started a larger counteroffensive from further west, crossing the border from Ukrainian territory into Russia. This Ukrainian advance was anticipated, but has not occurred so far. There is currently no clear and comprehensible information about the situation in the area. It can be concluded that the Russian army has managed to occupy some smaller villages on the western edge of the territory held by the Ukrainian army, but a Ukrainian counteroffensive has halted their advance. The Russian army is likely to attempt another offensive.

    – In the Kharkiv direction, positional battles continue and the Russian army has not undertaken major attacks.

    – The active offensive continues in the direction of Kupyansk and Luhansk cities, but no progress has been made. Russian units were passive in the Siversk direction yesterday.

    – In the area around Bakhmut, the intensity of Russian attacks is lower compared to before. In the Toretsk area, attempts to attack mainly on the eastern edge of the city did not yield results. The intensity of attacks has decreased compared to July and August.

    – The Russian army’s offensive in the Pokrovsk direction has intensified and they have improved their positions in at least one area. The situation is difficult for Ukrainian defenders in the west and southwest of Donetsk, where Russian army attacks are very intense. Serious battles continue in the area around Vuhledar. The Russian army did not manage to advance significantly yesterday.

    – A few smaller reconnaissance battles occurred on the southern front. Battles continue on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, but Ukrainian positions hold.

  7. For those who are curious about “how many are left” and “when will they run out you may find this math somewhat interesting

    [According to satalite images](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/0/d/1FnfGcdqah5Et_6wElhiFfoDxEzxczh7AP2ovjEFV010/htmlview#gid=0) Russia has roughly 2208 “decent” quality armored fighting vehicles left in storage and is pulling them out at a rate of about 7.9 per day. If we assume the rate is linear and continues indefinitely Russia will “run out” of “decent quality” armored vehicles in storage in late June 2025.

    Of course there are caveats on top of caveats with this math. In Ukraine’s favor we have the fact that the remaining vehicles are worse so Russia will need to pull more out from storage to generate the same combat power, lower quality vehicles are easier to destroy, some of this footage is old so even more may be taken out, not all “decent” quality vehicles will work ect. Some of the caveats in Russia’s favor is that as vehicles become rarer they will likely be used less frequently leading to fewer losses, just because they are out of storage doesn’t mean they have been destroyed, there may be some other yards not photographed, a certain percentage of the “poor” and “worse” quality vehicles will be operable with time ect.

    In other words we can’t actually say “Russia will run out in June” but at the same time summer 2025 may be a lot more dire than summer 2023 and if Ukraine can the hits coming then Russia can’t continue at this rate forever.

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