[SS from essay by Dana Stroul, Director of Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East from February 2021 to February 2024.]
Within 24 hours of Hamas’s October 7 terror attack, Hezbollah followed with an attack of its own, launching projectiles from Lebanon into northern Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, explained that the campaign was intended to strain Israel’s resources and force the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), then preparing its response to Hamas in Gaza, to fight on two fronts. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar hoped that Hezbollah, along with other Iranian-backed groups across the Middle East, would encircle Israel in a “ring of fire,” overwhelm its defenses, and threaten its existence.
Yet Nasrallah instead chose a middle-ground approach of incremental escalation—a pragmatic effort to signal solidarity with Hamas without risking Hezbollah’s survival as the most sophisticated and lethal arm of Iran’s proxy network. Since then, Hezbollah has continued to design its attacks to stay below the threshold of a full-scale conflagration. The group has continuously pressured northern Israel, forcing an estimated 80,000 civilians to evacuate their homes (creating a political challenge for the Israeli governing coalition) and forcing the IDF to allocate limited air defense, air power, and personnel to the north. But the confined geographic scope of the attacks; their target selection of military sites rather than civilian areas; and the choice of weapons used, refraining from drawing on an arsenal of precision-guided missiles, are telling.
OP claims Hezbollah and Israel interests are to reach a detente but the analysis ignores Hezbollah being reliant on Iran as a patron which requires Hezbollah to continue its policy of destabilizing Israel. Since that policy is not likely to change, Israel is incentivized to seize the opportunity to substantially reduce Hezbollah capabilities.
The rest of the article is pretty good.
The analyst space needs to come down to earth on this one.
>…Nasrallah instead chose a middle-ground approach of incremental escalation—a pragmatic effort to signal solidarity with Hamas without risking Hezbollah’s survival…
This is a bonkers take, even though it’s currently a middle ground analysis. Forget about moral takes for a moment. Hezbollah/Lebanon started shelling Israel in support of Hamas October 7 attack and the subsequent war. Started an artillery war against a neighbor with superior firepower.
They have been letting loose for a year. Border towns are all destroyed and depopulated. This is a war of choice, for Lebanon.
Hezbollah declared they will not stop until the palestinian issue is settled. Well… everyone knows that it’s not going to be settled. If Hezbollah stop shelling in respect for whatever cease fire Israel does (or doesn’t) sign with Hamas… they’ll hold “depopulate northern Israel again” as a card to be played when that ceasefire breaks… weeks or months later.
There’s no other way this could have gone.
The author’s solution is to negotiate Hezbollah 4 miles back from the border. Is that a joke?
For Israel it’s Litani or war, you can’t half way this. For the author to admit that the US would be incapable of negotiating Hezbollah beyond the Litani is proof war cannot be avoided.
4 comments
[SS from essay by Dana Stroul, Director of Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East from February 2021 to February 2024.]
Within 24 hours of Hamas’s October 7 terror attack, Hezbollah followed with an attack of its own, launching projectiles from Lebanon into northern Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, explained that the campaign was intended to strain Israel’s resources and force the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), then preparing its response to Hamas in Gaza, to fight on two fronts. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar hoped that Hezbollah, along with other Iranian-backed groups across the Middle East, would encircle Israel in a “ring of fire,” overwhelm its defenses, and threaten its existence.
Yet Nasrallah instead chose a middle-ground approach of incremental escalation—a pragmatic effort to signal solidarity with Hamas without risking Hezbollah’s survival as the most sophisticated and lethal arm of Iran’s proxy network. Since then, Hezbollah has continued to design its attacks to stay below the threshold of a full-scale conflagration. The group has continuously pressured northern Israel, forcing an estimated 80,000 civilians to evacuate their homes (creating a political challenge for the Israeli governing coalition) and forcing the IDF to allocate limited air defense, air power, and personnel to the north. But the confined geographic scope of the attacks; their target selection of military sites rather than civilian areas; and the choice of weapons used, refraining from drawing on an arsenal of precision-guided missiles, are telling.
OP claims Hezbollah and Israel interests are to reach a detente but the analysis ignores Hezbollah being reliant on Iran as a patron which requires Hezbollah to continue its policy of destabilizing Israel. Since that policy is not likely to change, Israel is incentivized to seize the opportunity to substantially reduce Hezbollah capabilities.
The rest of the article is pretty good.
The analyst space needs to come down to earth on this one.
>…Nasrallah instead chose a middle-ground approach of incremental escalation—a pragmatic effort to signal solidarity with Hamas without risking Hezbollah’s survival…
This is a bonkers take, even though it’s currently a middle ground analysis. Forget about moral takes for a moment. Hezbollah/Lebanon started shelling Israel in support of Hamas October 7 attack and the subsequent war. Started an artillery war against a neighbor with superior firepower.
They have been letting loose for a year. Border towns are all destroyed and depopulated. This is a war of choice, for Lebanon.
Hezbollah declared they will not stop until the palestinian issue is settled. Well… everyone knows that it’s not going to be settled. If Hezbollah stop shelling in respect for whatever cease fire Israel does (or doesn’t) sign with Hamas… they’ll hold “depopulate northern Israel again” as a card to be played when that ceasefire breaks… weeks or months later.
There’s no other way this could have gone.
The author’s solution is to negotiate Hezbollah 4 miles back from the border. Is that a joke?
For Israel it’s Litani or war, you can’t half way this. For the author to admit that the US would be incapable of negotiating Hezbollah beyond the Litani is proof war cannot be avoided.