[SS from essay by Carol E. B. Choksy, Senior Lecturer of Strategic Intelligence in the Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering at Indiana University; and Jamsheed K. Choksy, Distinguished Professor of Iranian and Central Eurasian Studies and Director of the Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center in the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies at Indiana University.]
When it comes to Iran’s capacity and desire to develop nuclear weapons, conventional wisdom in the West has generally held that Tehran treasures its so-called threshold status—in which it possesses the ability to quickly manufacture such armaments but does not do so. Threshold status should, in theory, afford Iran the leverage that comes with having a nuclear deterrent without the blowback. Proceeding from the belief that Iran prioritizes this leverage, analysts seeking to determine the country’s strategic calculus in its expanding conflict with Israel and the United States tend to focus on how it might retaliate by using traditional arms, such as ballistic missiles.
But these experts must not write off the potential for Iran to acquire a nuclear arsenal. The country’s growing vulnerability does not mean it will abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In fact, that vulnerability makes Tehran’s need for atomic munitions—and its incentive to complete manufacture of them—much greater.
They’ve been arming and funding attacks against a nuclear power and sent 200 ballistic missiles at them. Are they comically expecting they’d be safe from the same once they developed nuclear weapons?
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[SS from essay by Carol E. B. Choksy, Senior Lecturer of Strategic Intelligence in the Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering at Indiana University; and Jamsheed K. Choksy, Distinguished Professor of Iranian and Central Eurasian Studies and Director of the Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center in the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies at Indiana University.]
When it comes to Iran’s capacity and desire to develop nuclear weapons, conventional wisdom in the West has generally held that Tehran treasures its so-called threshold status—in which it possesses the ability to quickly manufacture such armaments but does not do so. Threshold status should, in theory, afford Iran the leverage that comes with having a nuclear deterrent without the blowback. Proceeding from the belief that Iran prioritizes this leverage, analysts seeking to determine the country’s strategic calculus in its expanding conflict with Israel and the United States tend to focus on how it might retaliate by using traditional arms, such as ballistic missiles.
But these experts must not write off the potential for Iran to acquire a nuclear arsenal. The country’s growing vulnerability does not mean it will abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In fact, that vulnerability makes Tehran’s need for atomic munitions—and its incentive to complete manufacture of them—much greater.
They’ve been arming and funding attacks against a nuclear power and sent 200 ballistic missiles at them. Are they comically expecting they’d be safe from the same once they developed nuclear weapons?