Ukraine Can Go Nuclear — Should it?

During his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking — that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.

It’s far from an idle threat, as most NATO governments will know. Not only does Ukraine have extensive civil nuclear facilities and supplies, it also has considerable expertise in nuclear weapons manufacturing. A senior Ukrainian official quoted by Bild was reported to have said earlier this year that: “We have the material, we have the knowledge. If there is an order, we will only need a few weeks until [we produce] the first bomb.”

The Ukrainian statement was made amid a tepid reaction to Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan, released in October, the less-than-certain supply of military aid after November’s US elections and continuing Russian advances on the battlefield.

Though Zelenskyy had previously delivered this message during a meeting with former President Trump, he has also clarified that Ukraine has no current plans to pursue nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s foreign ministry even had to issue a statement affirming that Kyiv has no plans to develop weapons of mass destruction and remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

Yet the President’s remarks highlight Ukrainian fears and a narrowing range of options. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum was supposed to provide Ukraine with an effective security guarantee. Under that deal, Ukraine believed it had received US, British and Russian security pledges in return for the surrender of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal then on its territory. It seemed a plausible arrangement for a young country in need of financial aid and international recognition. As we know, it was flouted by Russia and turned out to be a US-UK aspiration rather than a commitment.

Putin dismissed the Ukrainian statement as a dangerous provocation, warning of an appropriate response. He also conceded that constructing nuclear weapons was not hard, but questioned Ukraine’s ability to do so in current conditions. It appears the Kremlin’s tendency to underestimate Ukrainians remains difficult to shake.

So is the Ukrainian threat viable? Military expert Oleg Zhdanov argues that Ukraine has the, “scientific, industrial, and raw material base” to independently pursue nuclear capabilities to develop both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Given its history as an integral part of USSR nuclear program, Ukraine has nine nuclear waste sites containing 42 million tons of radioactive waste and a number of abandoned missile unit bases.

Soviet Ukraine designed and produced missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, a project spearheaded at the Pivdenmash factory under the leadership of then-director and later second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. The guidance systems were developed in Kharkiv, currently shelled almost daily. But Russia controlled the launch sequence and maintained operational control of the nuclear warheads and weapons systems.

Though the traditional big power nuclear strategy involves a “triad” of delivery systems — ground, air, and naval — Ukraine could operate effectively with just one or two components given Ukraine’s barely existent fleet. Since the US terminated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, Ukraine can construct missiles with a range of up to 5,500km (3,400 miles). It is already working on ballistic missile development for conventional loads.

However, political and economic considerations suggest that pursuing a nuclear path may not be worthwhile. For example, the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile like France’s M51 cost around €5bn ($5.4bn.) Israel, a much smaller country facing a similar permanent existential threat from less powerful enemies, reportedly spends over $1bn annually just on nuclear weapons support.

And of course, Israel’s experience starkly illustrates that nuclear weapons do not ensure absolute security. While a nuclear capability might have served Ukraine well as a potential deterrent before Russia’s armed aggression began in 2014, an exit from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could make Ukraine very unpopular and possibly provide its less-committed Western allies with a reason to withdraw funding and other support.

On top of that, a fully developed nuclear system would take a lot of time — Leonid Kuchma once noted that a “full cycle” for nuclear construction with delivery systems and technologies to bypass modern missile defense systems, would require a minimum of 10 years under peaceful conditions and full funding.

What are the alternatives then? There are two. The first would be the construction of a dirty bomb made from radioactive waste and delivered by a conventional weapons system like a combat aircraft. This is far easier and cheaper than a full-scale nuclear weapons program and is entirely plausible. It would be surprising if Ukraine hadn’t already considered this as a response to the (endlessly repeated) Russian threats to employ nuclear weapons against it.

The other is the path to fully fledged NATO membership, and soon. While Article 5 has never been fully tested, there is a possibility it could be effective in bringing the Ukraine war to an end.

Anything else suggests a grim future, for both Ukraine and for Europe. The former might continue to lose more territory, and people and the prospect of a better future.

There is a real danger here that the world would be foolish to ignore. If Ukraine one day faces the choice between national survival and its eradication by advancing Russian forces, what might it choose?

You don’t have to be a geopolitical expert to understand that Ukraine may refuse to go quietly into that good night of vanishing nations.

Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) Her work is focused on analyzing opportunities for Ukraine-Russia reconciliation with regard to fascism and totalitarianism in Russia and their effects on Russia. She is an experienced researcher, who in 2022 conducted the studies ‘The Work of the Ukrainian Parliament in Wartime’ and ‘The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Media.’  

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.