Moldova’s Fate? Better Than it May Look

The so-so news was that the pro-Western bid to have European Union (EU) membership enshrined in the constitution only just passed by 50.46% to 49.54%. The better news? That we’ve seen this movie before and it had a happy(ish) ending.

Six years ago, in the Western Balkans, a referendum on joining the EU and NATO also ended with a result that many found unclear and troubling. 

But with substantial efforts by pro-Western Macedonians and their international allies, the shaky referendum result in 2018 ultimately solidified into a clear Western turn for the nation. With luck and determination, Moldova could see a similar result.

Macedonia’s referendum asked voters if they favored EU and NATO membership as part of an agreement to change the country’s name to North  Macedonia, which Greece insisted on to distinguish it from Greek Macedonia.

Just as in Moldova, nationalists and pro-Russian groups ran an intense campaign against the measure. Western diplomats in Macedonia warned the government against holding the vote, believing it was overconfident. The same worries preceded the Moldova vote.

The Macedonian outcome was 94% approval of the government’s proposal. But referendum opponents had urged a boycott, and turnout was only 36.5% — far below the number required to make an official referendum result binding.

Many major Western media immediately described the Macedonian outcome as a deep disappointment for the government and a victory for Russia. Similarly, some called the Moldovan result a setback and shock for strongly pro-Western President Maia Sandu.

However, despite the ambiguous referendum outcome, the situation in Macedonia eventually turned to the West’s advantage.

How? And are there lessons for Moldova in Macedonia’s experience?

In both cases, pre-referendum groundwork gave the government a starting advantage. For years, the EU and US had provided generous financial aid to Macedonia. Similar work has been done in Moldova, with Western-funded projects draped in EU and US markings.

In Macedonia, Western nations gave heavy support to local media and civil society groups, many of which strongly backed EU and NATO membership. Western nations have long supported pro-democracy Moldovan media.

Western nations also decided victory in Macedonia was worth some rough play.

Ahead of the referendum, the US shared with Greece a wiretap indicating that Russia was paying Macedonian nationalists to demonstrate against the referendum. Greece, which considered Macedonia’s name change essential, swiftly expelled two Russian diplomats.

After the referendum, Macedonia’s government and its Western backers needed the votes of several recalcitrant members of the National Assembly to approve a constitutional amendment to make the name change official. Heavy pressure was applied, including on members still vulnerable to criminal charges over an attack on parliament the year before. Brushing aside human rights activists who opposed leniency, an amnesty was arranged and the amendment passed.

In Moldova, too, pro-Western forces have acted aggressively. Sandu’s government banned its top opponent, the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șorfrom running for office, and shut down several Russian television stations. The EU has shown its own muscle, sanctioning several Moldovans for allegedly trying to destabilize the country.

To be sure, Moldova is not Macedonia. Macedonia, a former republic of Yugoslavia, had little history with Russia. In contrast, Moldova was part of the Soviet Union. Many Moldovans speak Russian and regularly consume Russian media.

Russian threats to Macedonia that joining NATO could make it a Russian nuclear target came across as farfetched; Moldova borders a real war in Ukraine that could easily spill into its tiny territory.

In a larger sense, though, the Macedonian and Moldovan situations are quite similar.

Russia could not offer Macedonia, nor can it offer Moldova, significant economic aid or membership in a powerful economic bloc. It will spend money of course, but the funds are channeled into influence-purchasing and propaganda.

Moscow’s vision for Moldova is the same it wanted for Macedonia: to be without friends in a highly dangerous neighborhood, while depriving itself of the benefits of EU membership.

With Moldova isolated, Moscow could extend efforts to undermine its government, while reinforcing the Russian military garrison in Transnistria, a rebellious Moldovan province just an hour’s drive from the national capital.

Ahead of the October 20 referendum, Moldova’s one tiny airport received a stream of Westerners bringing Sandu encouragement and aid, including Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Italian President Sergio Mattarella, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The EU pledged $1.9bn in aid just before the vote in October, the largest-ever package offered to Moldova.

The challenge now for Western nations is to keep that level of attention high. By Western accounts, Russia is prepared to incite violence before or after the second round of presidential elections November 3. Sandu will face an opponent who is — at best — less hostile to Russia and acceptable to pro-Kremlin figures.

In particular, the West will need to convince Moldovans that it can, somehow, offer them a measure of protection in case Russia defeats Ukraine and looks for new conquests. NATO membership was not part of the Moldovan referendum, although NATO member Romania borders Macedonia and has long considered it a vital interest.

No one can predict a country’s ultimate fate based on one referendum. Macedonia received NATO membership immediately after its vote and name change, but is still struggling to join the EU.

In Moldova’s case, it must still traverse some highly dangerous months of what Sandu and her allies call all-out, last-ditch Russian efforts to turn it away from its Western course. In that effort, the courage, visibility, and solidarity of Moldova’s Western allies will be essential.

Thomas Kent is a consultant on disinformation issues for governments, NGOs, and media, and teaches at Columbia University. His latest book, “How Russia Loses,” contains a lengthy analysis of the Macedonian referendum and its aftermath.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.