The outcomes of Moldova’s October 20 referendum and first round of its presidential elections have cast doubt on the depth of the country’s commitment to EU accession, offering a warning for Georgia as it heads into a general election just days later. 

In both Moldova and Georgia, the elections have been framed as decisive moments that could determine their futures within Europe or within Russia’s sphere of influence. 

A resounding ‘yes’ vote in the referendum on on the inclusion of EU integration in Moldova’s constitution was expected. Instead, Moldova’s President Maia Sandu and her pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a very narrow win in the referendum, while Sandu’s re-election prospects remain uncertain ahead of the second round of the presidential election on November 3. 

Similarly, while Georgia is holding a general election on October 26, the vote is broadly seen as a referendum on the country’s positioning vis-a-vis the EU and Russia. 

As Jason Bruder, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told a webinar organised by CEPA ahead of the Moldovan elections: “The people who called the elections did so in a way that very much framed them in terms of decision points.” 

There are some obvious parallels between Moldova and Georgia — both are small post-Soviet countries, and both have part of their territory occupied by Russia- backed separatists (Transnistria in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia). For both, their post-1991 history has to a large extent been defined by their positioning towards Russia; they are on the new geopolitical frontline between Russia’s influence and the West’s, with their political centres of gravity sporadically shifting from one to the other. 

Leadership differences 

One thing that differentiates Moldova and Georgia is their respective leadership. Moldovan President Maia Sandu a most prominent champions of the EU integration, and her administration has made significant strides, earning Moldova EU candidate status in 2022 and launching accession negotiations in 2024. 

“Under Sandu’s leadership, there has been a clear shift toward EU integration,” said Natalia Otel Belan, director of the Europe and Eurasia Division at the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), in an interview with bne IntelliNews ahead of the Moldovan elections. “Moldovans are beginning to see themselves as part of Europe.”

Lucjan Kubica, an expert on Russia and Eastern Partnership countries at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HybridCOE), made a similar point. “For the first time in Moldova’s independent history, this is a genuinely pro-European government,” he said. 

By contrast, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party continues to send mixed signals. Despite officially supporting EU accession, the party has taken steps that undermine Georgia’s democratic progress, such as passing a “foreign agents” law modelled on Russia’s 2012 legislation. This, combined with a series of anti-LGBTQ laws, has drawn criticism from European officials and cast doubt on the country’s European future.

“We’ve seen a very dramatic backsliding, especially over the last nine months since Georgia gained candidate status,” non-resident fellow at CEPA Ketevan Chachava told the CEPA webinar. 

Georgia is informally led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire oligarch behind Georgian Dream. Despite his official retirement from politics, Ivanishvili’s immense wealth — equivalent to a third of Georgia’s GDP — gives him significant influence and having made his billions in Russia, his relationship with Moscow remains complex. 

Georgian Dream has refrained from restoring diplomatic relations with Moscow since the 2008 war, but it has sought closer ties, including restarting direct flights with Russia and refusing to join Western sanctions against Moscow.

Russian interference 

Russia’s influence is a defining factor in both Moldova and Georgia. Its interference has been more obvious in Moldova, where authorities have recently uncovered organised efforts to disrupt the election process. 

Ahead of the elections, Moldovan authorities announced they had uncovered a scheme to sway the vote by bribing voters. They estimated $15mn had been spent in September alone, and that the full figure could have been as high as $100mn. More details emerged on October 24, when the Moldovan police announced fugitive businessman and politician Ilan Shor had directed $39mn into a scheme to bribe voters in September and October. 

There have also been reports that Moldovans were trained in Russia, and reportedly also in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, to incite unrest around the elections. 

Similar tactics are at play in Georgia. According to a recent Bloomberg investigation, Russian spies have infiltrated key Georgian institutions, including the foreign ministry and central bank, raising concerns about the integrity of Georgia’s political system.

In both countries, the stakes are high. Sandu faces an uphill battle as she seeks re-election, while Moldova’s pro-EU future hangs in the balance. In Georgia, voters face a choice between a path toward further European integration — and EU officials have made it clear they will not tolerate actions by Georgian Dream to undermine democracy — or a turn toward Moscow’s influence.

Economic concerns

Still, for many people in both countries, especially in rural areas, the focus is not on geopolitics but on immediate economic concerns. In rural areas, economic survival trumps discussions of EU membership. This creates a disconnect between the urban pro-Western elite and the broader population.

Moldova, already one of the poorest countries in Europe, was among the hardest hit countries by the coronavirus pandemic, and just as its recovery got underway it was hammered again by the twin blows of the war in neighbouring Ukraine and a gas crisis manufactured by Russia that sent inflation soaring. 

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling Georgian Dream party has played on the population’s fears of another war. Their “peace” narrative has been a powerful tool in their campaign, especially against the backdrop of the ongoing war in nearby Ukraine. “For many Georgians, the memory of the 2008 war is still fresh,” said Chachava. “Peace, especially in our region, is a very tangible thing. Georgian Dream has successfully positioned itself as the party that can maintain stability.”

As Georgians prepare to head to the polls on October 26, the lessons from Moldova’s election offer a cautionary tale. Even with a staunchly pro-EU government, the road to EU integration is fraught with obstacles — both domestic and external.

In Georgia, there are fears among opposition supporters that yet another victory for Georgian Dream could signal a continued drift toward authoritarianism and closer ties with Russia, while they hope a win for the opposition might offer a renewed push for EU integration.