Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1 is likely to push the Netanyahu administration to continue its escalating responses in the regional conflict. The incident follows similar strikes in April. While neither attack inflicted extensive damage, Tehran’s decision to directly target civilian areas, including Tel Aviv, raises alarms.

In April, Israel opted for a measured response on Iranian military sites. Now, numerous other options seem to be on the table, ranging from attacks on Iran’s oil refineries and targeted assassinations on Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to potential strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Proponents have argued that the current moment is ripe for an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, citing the urgent need to thwart Iran’s imminent nuclear breakout time, the failure of diplomatic efforts, and the ongoing regional conflict.

Yet this perspective glosses over some of the complexities and potential repercussions of such an attack. The Israeli government’s choice to refrain from striking nuclear facilities is a sound decision and should not be reconsidered. Targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities would not eliminate the existential threat a nuclear Iran poses to Israel. In fact, it would exacerbate it. While a diplomatic solution is slow and cumbersome, it remains the most viable option for curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions.

The Limits of Military Strikes

Critics advocating military strikes often view diplomacy as an inadequate tool against Iranian proliferation. While it is undeniable that negotiations have faltered and the prospects for a new nuclear deal are bleak, the notion that military strikes represent a logical alternative is flawed for several reasons.

First, completely destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities is an incredible challenge. Unlike Israel’s counter-proliferation strikes in 1981 against Iraq and in 2007 against Syria—both targeting isolated reactors—Iran’s nuclear program consists of numerous uranium production and enrichment sites, mines, and research facilities, all of which are more advanced and dispersed. To dismantle this program would require an extraordinarily complex military operation, with the risk that any “centrifuge program could be reconstituted in a more survivable form relatively quickly.”

Second, key installations, such as Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities, are fortified, requiring bunker-buster munitions for total destruction. This would likely require U.S. support, particularly through its more advanced Massive Ordnance Penetrator designed for targeting underground sites (while Israel possesses a smaller bunker buster, the damage would likely be limited). Yet President Biden has expressed opposition to striking Iranian nuclear sites. Any support for such Israeli actions could draw Washington deeper into the conflict, provoking international outrage and complicating U.S. efforts to garner global support on other fronts, including Ukraine and the South China Sea.

Third, even in a best-case scenario where military strikes effectively destroy key facilities, the knowledge base surrounding uranium enrichment, reactor technology, and the fuel cycle necessary for sustaining nuclear fission would remain intact. Eliminating this knowledge would require sustained covert operations within Iran’s scientific community—a strenuous and hard-to-sustain endeavor. While Israel has historically employed targeted assassinations to limit this knowledge, it is questionable whether such a strategy aligns with Mossad’s long-term objectives in dealing with Iranian nuclear capabilities.

The Counterproductive Nature of Strikes

More crucial than the persistence of technical knowledge is the determination to pursue nuclear weapons. Past military aggression against Iranian nuclear facilities has only bolstered Iran’s resolve, which might be more accurate. Research indicates that despite Israeli covert operations—including cyberattacks and assassinations—Iran has consistently increased its stockpile of enriched uranium and operational centrifuges. In 2021, Iran enriched uranium to 60 percent for the first time in direct response to the Israeli sabotage operation against Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility in 2021 (90 percent is considered weapons-grade uranium). Israeli operations only temporarily halt Iranian nuclear ambitions. The most successful military interventions occur when a proliferation threat is nascent; Iran is well past that threshold.

Furthermore, Iranian nuclear hedging has largely been in response to perceived threats to its survival. Looking at another example, Pakistan’s nuclear program, for instance, emerged as a direct reaction to the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Similarly, Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions. A full-scale Israeli assault on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely heighten Tehran’s threat perception and accelerate its pursuit of a nuclear arsenal.

While military strikes might temporarily hinder Iran’s nuclear advancements, they would be unlikely to halt them altogether and would likely drive Iran’s nuclear program further underground.

A Path Forward

Critics of strikes on nuclear facilities often cite the risk of igniting a broader regional war. With escalating conflicts involving Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, such a war has already begun. Yet military strikes could prolong existing conflicts and contribute to a chaotic regional landscape.

Central Intelligence Agency director William Burns said earlier this month that there is no evidence Iran has decided to develop a nuclear weapon. Thus far, Tehran has leveraged its nuclear program as a hedge rather than an offensive capability. While the country has been inching closer to proliferation, it has not crossed the threshold, indicating a—albeit slim—window for diplomatic engagement. While diplomacy has neither been particularly effective nor an interest of Israel, it may be useful to pursue incremental diplomatic efforts rather than aiming for a grand, comprehensive deal like the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Deal of Action. Israel could back limited, tactical deals that freeze the most concerning aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for partial sanctions relief. Smaller, more achievable diplomatic efforts can slow down the process while avoiding the all-or-nothing failures of past negotiations. Intermediaries in the region could facilitate indirect negotiations between Israel, the U.S., European countries, and Iran. This could help keep communication channels open without committing to formal talks. China or Russia, with whom Iran is growing its ties, also have an interest in keeping Iran from proliferating and might be willing to push Iran towards nuclear restraint.

Israel may want to push for tougher sanctions specifically focused on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, particularly in cooperation with other powers. Sanctions should be specific to target industries or individuals tied directly to the nuclear program, such as blocking technology imports and freezing assets related to Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure.

It is essential for Israel to consider the broader implications of any military action against Iran. While hardliners like former prime minister Naftali Bennett may tout military strikes as a historic opportunity to reshape the Middle East, Israel must weigh whether such actions align with its long-term interests and help mitigate its growing isolation from the international community.

Doreen Horschig is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.