Clash of Realities: The Middle East and the Russian-Ukrainian War

Clash of Realities: The Middle East and the Russian-Ukrainian War

Russia is learning from Iran you have the the weaponization of of sexual violence and rape mm which is also very Isis style Russian tactics in Ukraine resemble uh terrorist extreme extremist strategies Joe Biden back then a presidential candidate he called uh Saudi Arabia an outcast in international relations we saw the welcoming um that U shall we say ceremony that that happened to Mr Putin when he visited the UAE and also uh Saudi this kind of RoR does not actually work well in these countries Ukraine did did a miracle [Music] basically hi my name is Alina henko I’m an international relations expert and this is talking substance where we break down complex issues into Simple Truth today on the agenda we have another very much complex issue which is the Middle East and its cohesion and relation to the Russian Ukrainian War we’re going to be talking to Dr Omar ashur which is a professor of security and Military studies at the Doha Institute and director of strategic studies at the Arab Center for research and policy studies Dr asure is based in Doha which is why we’re going to be talking online please check this episode like and do not forget to subscribe hello thank you very much for your time welcome to talking substance and let’s just go down directly into our discussion let’s start talking about the current geopolitical developments in the region in the Middle East I believe it is quite important especially for our people our audience who are a little bit out of the context and do not follow uh the what is actually happening in the region uh it is important to analyze what are the current um powerful actors in the region because from our perspective after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 something sort of a vacuum of power a vacuum of influence happened in the region so what is actually happening now are there any countries actors who are fighting and competing to become a regional power and a global power perhaps in in in strategic uh strategically what what are your uh what is your perspective on this on this issue first thank you Alina for the kind invitation it’s a pleasure and an honor to be here with the KF post uh of course with a very long history I’ve been monitoring your uh your developments and your great achievements so it’s a pleasure to be with you and congrats for this excellent podcast as well which is quite impact impactful and quite informative actually um with respect to the region and the US yes it’s a it’s never boring here right so the developments have been quite rapid and uh the withdrawal specifically uh from Afghanistan uh by the US um has created a series of unintended consequences I think uh part of that actually uh I want to clarify the US never really withdrew completely you know we have a uh quite a few uh large bases including one just 40 actually 30 minutes from where I am now um where the US military power is actually uh quite um apparent um but it is less and less interested in entering into um large scale military operations like the one we saw in Iraq before and in Afghanistan and the withdrawal from Afghanistan that way I think was uh had a series of unintended con quences among them uh was probably the uh the escalation and The fullscale Invasion U uh of Ukraine partly because the the US and its allies were looked at as uh defeated by a a militia basically by the Taliban from Afghanistan in that way and therefore they will not stand up for uh an ally but that’s another issue we can come uh to a bit later in our conversation but clearly the the the when you when you’re steadily withdrawing from the region um that power vacuum will be filled uh it was filled by multiple actors uh none of them so far are rising to the level of the US intervention and U military and political cloud in the region uh one of them is Russia clearly we saw it was quite successful in its Syria campaign in in 2015 it it a regime was was that was about to be um taken over um somehow they uh Russia with its Ally Iran with other non-state actors like hisbah like others managed to keep it intact um and um managed as well to extend a bit of the uh um um we can call it the allies of of Russia like Iran for example managed to extend a bit of the of influence uh in the region including in places uh like Lebanon like Yemen um like even Gaza but also uh like Syria so uh and including in Iraq which is quite interesting because the US intervened uh to have a to partly to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein and then later on to build a democracy in Iraq and that did not really work quite well uh but it became more Iraq became more and more closer to uh Iran in some of its policies at least um and Iran as we know is in attack some some would put it as a tactical and others would put as a strategic Ally uh of the uh Russian Federation so that that uh removal and withdrawal of the US had a series of uh consequences on the Middle East but also uh in Europe and elsewhere in the region yes so uh I was uh just wondering because it seems like from Ukraine when you are observing on what is observing what is happening in the region within the context of Russian Ukraine war it seems to be so that there is Saudi Arabia who is trying aspiring to become a regional power and Global power and that is one of its uh one of the reasons of its motivation why they are like having its neutral position and uh relying on its neutrality in this conflict they still are trying to Pro provide a platform for negotiations between the two sides even like if we remember the jeda summit uh the jeda peace talks that happened last year um even with the fact that considering the fact that that those peace talks were happening without the Russian counterparts it’s still Pro trying to provide a platform for negotiations at the same time there is United Arab Emirates who are also somehow involved in this process who are negotiating meeting about releasing the prisoners of War so uh that was um my question about exactly this so is there any competition happening between the regional countries for regional power and how do they if they do benefit Russian and Ukrainian conflict Russian Ukrainian war in this context is it helping it anyhow for these Powers maybe it’s not only Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates maybe there are also other countries who has somehow tried to get involved and engaged in this conflict without being uh without being judged from one or the other side of being uh of being biased so there’s a lot going on right and it needs a bit of History just to to simplify it uh so you had in in southern four the the orange revolution in Ukraine and a series of other uh civil resistance campaigns pro-democracy civil resistance campaigns that happened in Serbia in 2 in in Georgia and Southern 3 in Ukraine Southern four kirgisistan Southern and five and later on it happened in the region a series of civil resistance campaign against corrupt repressive regimes um and they were framed rightly or wrongly as the Arab Spring between quations um and that uh by 2014 when the the maidan Theo the maidan revolution the the revolution of dignity happened in Ukraine again it was the these most of the Arab Spring movements uh were defeated so the the project for change towards um democracy was Was Defeated within that project there was two Regional Rising Regional Powers um while you mentioned the US the US was withdrawing at this point especially from Iraq under the Obama Administration and lessening its interventions uh including actually its commitment to Ukraine in when Crimea was invaded and then annexed later in in March 2014 uh they had a commitment based on the the Buddha pest memorandum they did not commit that was part of the largest strategy of withdrawing back uh from from conflicts but when that happened in the Middle East um you had two Regional uh Powers who one wanted change uh that was mainly Qatar wanted to see a bit of a um a change in the ruling models in the region and others wanted continuity meaning the status quo should be kept as it is even if it has problems it it will keep stability and that was Saudi and the UAE primarily uh those Powers um were Rising because the traditional Powers uh Egypt Iraq uh Syria had their their um had their major problems economic demographic uh political and security and they were in a in a receding mood and a collapsing mood so these traditional Powers historically and and contemporary were receding while the gulf uh were Rising but the gulf was Rising with two different Visions um a vision for change uh primarily pro-democracy movement um the opinion and the other opinion you have Al jazer here uh um offering two sides of the story uh while one was more of of continuity and and within that that frame uh you saw this competition but they also approach the competition with different ways so you had Qatar the Qatari way was more of a a soft power approach approach of credibility peace diplomacy uh more media education and uh as well as trying to maintain relationship with almost everybody uh you had a different way different approach with the UAE which more or less looked at stability and while um projecting some military power uh primarily via non-state actors at some point as we see in cases like in Libya in Sudan in Yemen and so on so supporting some of the secessionist movements some of the organizations that were um like the uh the rapid support force in Sudan tribal militia turned into a a military uh Force within the um armed forces and so on so it it had a different way for for for for for what it seed as as maintaining stability um but also the soft power was important so being looked at as a credible negotiator someone with credible uh mediation skills was was quite important Qatar Rose in that it was successful multiple times the the last part of it it hosted the negotiations between the United States and the Taliban uh but also it hosted others uh Saudi and the UAE wanted to have the same um shall we say file the Afghan file because of its GE strategic and um uh security impacts on the region uh but also when it comes to Ukraine that’s part of it that’s part of of of extending uh the power of mediation the power of being looked at as a a peace diplomacy power house and um and and therefore you know being credible the problem with the with perhaps and that’s that’s just my perspective um with the Saudis and the UAE they were looked as Too Close um to to to one side which is the Russian side um it’s not a secret that the the sanction busting uh regime uh goes via you know exporting gold to Russia and other equip go through the the the UAE um SAR situation um the the when at some point the the the Saudi uh regime uh the current de facto ruler the Crown Prince was looked at as cracking down on um and violating human rights uh values and so on um the main one who was quite seen as welcoming and and quite seen as as as supporting him was Mr Putin as opposed to others uh in the Western World so in a way these two sides were seen as quite close to one side of the party although now things are changing uh but also you had the the the Qatari side where you you had a a way to look at the conflict as a smaller state that aspires for freedom and Independence like Ukraine uh and this is attempted to be stopped by the larger neighbor by the stronger neighbor with a rhetoric that they they know here quite well and was seen here quite well as as latest 2017 when Qatar was blockade so you had the heart going towards Ukraine but also the mind is is feeding Russia um so so these are the the Dynamics I don’t know if I explained well but it’s quite complicated um and it’s a rapidly developing situation so as we know always in the Middle East these these alliances can shift quite easy uh but one issue there is that the the also this is back to your first question is is that the um the the longest relationship remains with the US most of these countries have very strong ties with the US um this may change in the future uh but so far it is upheld yeah it is quite complicated I totally agree with you but this is exactly what we do here in talking substance we try to explain complicated issues uh as simple as possible so going back to uh the topic of the United States that you mentioned um I’m interested if the US perspective on the region changed with the outbreak uh when when the war or when the full scale Invasion out broke because as far as I remember uh a couple of years ago Joe Biden back then a presidential candidate he called uh Saudi Arabia an outcast in international relations and refused to speak directly to Crown Prince and prime minister Muhammad bin Salman throughout the start of this term and yet um he a couple of years ago he controversially visited Saudi Arabia I believe there was an incident when I guess the Crown Prince decided not to shake hands with him as far as I remember there was uh all over the media how has the Russian Ukrainian War potentially altered um or like potentially expanded so the Avenues available uh for Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in terms with United States um so in a way the continuity is still there so in a way you will have the the uh the support that was given by um uh the US um to to to Ukraine since 2022 well since depending on where you draw the line from 2016 or or from 2014 or from you know the actual age from 20122 uh some most of the countries here endorsed it in the region they did not U did not try to undermine it or or or to do anything about it but on the other end they uh the war itself um most of them want to distance themselves from the war effort uh in Qatar the the focus is on humanitarian issues on issues of Peace negotiations if if that’s on the agenda the same thing with with Saudi um but at the same time uh you will see on the Saudi and the UAE side a bit more of support and endorsement uh for uh for for the leadership of the Russian Federation we saw the welcoming um that U um the welcoming uh shall we say ceremony that that happened to Mr Putin when he visited uh the UAE and also um Saudi um but at the same time the the the the the continuity is still there so there’s no there’s no shifting towards one side very uh very strongly um or or or or to towards the other side uh just uh being very very careful and trying to on one end benefit uh from from the from the relationship with Russia in the case of Saudi and the UAE but at the same time being looked as uh credible negotiators uh in terms of their uh soft power advantages as well okay I can see now uh so I guess uh we can uh move a little bit forward uh the topic with the US is fully covered I think everything I wanted to ask you about the uh relationship of the Middle Eastern countries with the US I got my my answers thank you very much so the question now here I’m just wondering how do the Middle Eastern countries percept the uh the Russian Ukrainian War because yeah we can see we can see clearly that those countries um are well not sitting on the fence but it’s still neutral in this conflict but um can we compare somehow the perception of the Middle Eastern countries to other regions like Asia for example because the Asian countries mostly like India or China or let’s say Asian countries are also neutral but they have its own motivation we can see Latin American countries they’re also neutral uh well we can at least officially because from time to time we hear some uh some interesting so to speak uh propositions from L American leaders uh regarding the Russian Ukrainian conflict can we somehow compare the neutrality of the Middle Eastern countries to the neutrality of other regions because neutrality too has its own motivation so I wouldn’t say uh just uh I wouldn’t say I wouldn’t described as neutral to be honest um the the region has so we’re talking here mainly about official stances right so about governments and regimes as opposed to people people you can things I will get to people in a second but it just gets even more complicated when when when you look at the surveys and the the opinion polls uh but just at the at the government level from Latin America to Southeast Asia it’s or to to East Asia it’s it’s still complicated argentinia versus Brazil two two very different stances Colombia uh government versus Colombian opposition very different stances um I mean you have situation with Cuba that that’s that’s a clear unneutral stance um but any any if if you move further uh westwards to the Middle East um you have also very different stances Morocco versus Algeria Algeria clear communication stance in support of Russia and uh Morocco apparently the t-72s that that Ukraine received bya a third country uh originated from from from Morocco so you have also even in the region very different stances Egypt a classic case uh at one point was about to provide the um tens to hundreds of thousands of 122 mm um artillery rocket artillery uh uh grad ammunition to uh to uh to Russia and then the the phone call uh or or the conversation between the the president and his um uh one of his commanders um was intercepted and as a result the US started putting some pressure to end this uh deal which was going towards towards Russia just to be able to make money so just to put it in perspective the the Egyptian government receives 1.3 billion US dollars every uh year uh for its Army so the United States trains equips finances uh the Egyptian Army um since 1979 basically since the peace deal with Israel uh and at the same time they’re trying to sell um artill um ammunition to the Strategic rival or a strategic threat now for the United States and its allies and that that that artillery would land on Ukrainian heads so this is how things are are murky and complicated in that sense but then it switches Sid it switches sides because they were exposed right so they the intelligence did did the job and and and they were exposed and then you you move a bit even further west and uh and you find the Dynamics that I I just explained with the the Doha Forum here in 2022 was just Ukraine you know well the Ukraine was on every single panel um so and then in 2023 things change because again a gen a a the Dynamics of the region shift very fast and in very different directions um Hamas did its uh its attack on on on Israel Israel invaded Gaza you had a a completely shifting Dynamics and this is one way also to perceive how uh coming to the people of the region where Ukraine uh where do they stand on Ukraine um people here and governments in the Middle East identify with issues like uh OCC understand what is occupation understand what is forced deportation understand what is Colonial settlers and Colonial settlements like the 500,000 we see in in Crimea and elsewhere in the dbas and they understand what is colonialism and history of colonialism what is war of Liberation what is war of Liberation when you do when when you talking when your commanders of the war of Liberation are are speaking the language of their colonizers so you know the entire this is Russian language so you know the the entire command of algeria’s War of the independence were French speaking M they never saw themselves as French but they were French speakers and they were communicating in in French and they had some of them had to learn Arabic when they went to to to to Egypt and so they understand these Dynamics quite well on one end but also they they they don’t like double standards because they see the double standard all the time um so in in that way this is how sometimes Ukraine is perceived through the Palestinian for the Arabs in the region for the the the in the Middle East um Ukraine many of them can see Ukraine through a Palestinian lens and and that needs to be also uh taken into account but also with the governments they see especially the smaller State the governments of the smaller States Kuwait Qatar uh others would see also Ukraine in a in a lens of a small state of a of a smaller state so Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe after after Russia and but it it is relatively smaller than Russia and Russia is the aggressor here so Kuwait for example has a very similar history you know larger neighbor Iraq under sdam quite aggressive almost swallowed the country um except for an International Coalition led by the US that that liberated the country after being swallowed actually um Qatar similar situation two very large and strong neighbors Saudi on one end Iran on the other and um and they perceive the war in Ukraine as if Ukraine Goa bids lost with all this NATO backing with all the the European countries behind with all with over 50 uh countries um in the Ramstein friends of Ukraine group supporting uh then they are real trouble they are in real if it lost conventionally you know but by conventional Force by mass because that’s that’s the way you’re losing by mess you’re killing of the enemy more than they kill of you what we call the loss exchange ratio uh was what at one point was seven to one in in bakut you still lost bakut so you’re losing not because you’re you’re fighting more effectively uh but the the size of the force that is attacking you is is is a lot bigger and therefore they they can withstand this type of iteration you can kill five of them and they kill one of you and they will take the five and bring more and and you can’t you can’t replace so if this is this is very uh scary for smaller States because then they you know they’re in trouble when Ukraine wins not if when Ukraine wins and and when it becomes Victorious uh I think they will all be back to hybrid because hybrid was was a less costly way of but this is a perspective of of of smaller state which is also a lens that is Ukraine is looked at and the final lens that people would people both people and governments would look at here is the um authoritarian versus democracy lens you know they they see and but this is this needs a bit more um media bit more education because they don’t know much about what happened in Ukraine between 1991 and and now even before 1991 the Dynamics of that that Ukraine did did a miracle basically did did did strides in in in in transition of of its civil civil relations and civil military relations that is uh that is um quite unique and and can serve as a model for many of the countries here and I’m to be very Frank ukra did not have a a very it had a complex history between it interreligious relations especially with Jewish populations and Muslim populations and int Dynamics um it had some issues with u Regional issues linguistic issues and somehow that that was overcame that was overcame with a 70% uh uh over 70% elected uh president from Jewish Origins and currently a Muslim defense minister uh from Crimea from from the uh from the region that that is occupied uh by the by the uh by the Russian Federation and and it it made major major movements and or major major achievements and develop and U um uh changes positive changes in that regard um and and this is a lens that is looked at that uh this is this is more of a a democratic model that can defend itself um militarily because if if you if you put a model of freedom and democracy on one end but also can protect itself as opposed to um collapses um this is a lens that will be looked at in in a very positive way versus the other model which is the authoritarian model which they they’re quite familiar with as well in the Middle East question uh you mentioned Jewish uh origin of President ziny and just a question popped uh popped up in my mind do you consider uh this to be a problem or an obstacle in communicating with the regional countries who are Muslim as we all know in its majority do you think that this can this is an obstacle that can be aggravated in the context of the Israel and Palestinian conflict happening nowadays no it’s not the uh I don’t think the Jew the jewishness or the Judaism because you know you have the region was has a very long history with the with the Jewish uh people with Jewish communities within the Muslim majority countries uh that that was not a a very easy as well relationship but it it it it was a a a historical fact um and um and many of these uh there was a history of conflict but there was also history of Co cooperation and and and peace F Co coexistence and actually positive peaceful Co coexistence for centuries um so so it’s it’s not that issue I think the the main issue is um um the the the political statements sometimes are are misunderstood in one way or another um also they have here the the the main um uh if it’s a very sensitive topic so if the communications are perceived as um double standard uh or as upholding a double standard meaning that you would um at one point you would be fighting a war uh of Independence against occupation but at the same time you don’t say much about occupation of other territories then this will be seen as a as a will not perceive in in a positive way uh that’s on one end but also on the other end people are the obviously Zionism is a is a whole um it’s it’s a political ideology you will have the the founders some of the founders of of Zionism um were Jews but they also abandoned Zionism changed their minds at one point including the the founder pre Herzel um but also you have the um the people who are Zionism the zionists the founder of of Israel who did not really were atheists right they did not believe in God so you know the compl like Zionism is not always is not equivalent to Judaism this is or the Jewish religion is this is what I’m trying to say but also within Zionism you have like multiple strands you have the political revolutionary revisionists so there’s a whole story so here here these Dynamics are are blurred Sometimes some you need to explain a lot and to sit and perhaps take a course in in the class to to to try to distinguish between all of this what religion so there’s here there’s Islam and islamism right islamism is a political IDE 1970s or maybe 1940s depending on where you draw the line 20th century political ideology that uh used some texts from from Islam and then turned it into a a a v a vision it’s all human agency there’s nothing holy about it intellectuals uh and and figures and political figures and activists from the 20th century who decided to create an ideology Zionism and Judaism you have similar you have the religion and and then you have the the political ideology and even the political ideology has its own factions and and ideological strands and this needs to be understood to to to make the difference but back back to to to your question no it’s not it’s not being Jewish for of course um but it’s it’s just the political statements that may be associated with um with double standards yeah because it’s uh seems to be a little bit of a problem nowadays for Ukraine to promote its interest in the so-called Global South countries as as in Asia for example in Latin America as well and in the uh Middle East also due to many many different reasons so that’s just the question that popped in my mind because in Asia um when you try to rely on democratic values and Democratic rhetorics human rights protection and things like that this kind of rhetoric does not actually work well in these countries as well as I believe in uh middle easn due to its uh specific like historical specific political specific which is absolutely acceptable because you know there many different countries in the world they’re all are different and H have its own uh have its own specific features which we have to take into account and also I want to uh go back a little bit to the dichotomy that you mentioned the dichotomy between Democratic and author authoritarian what uh how can we uh how do the countries of the Middle East assess Iran and its cooperation with Russia because definitely their bilateral relations their trade and all the benefits that Iran gets from trade with Russia from Trading uh Weaponry with Russia it has its own implications for regional Dynamics as well because both country share strategic interests they face common adversaries the United States namely so what can be actually done uh like from from the Middle Eastern countries that can confine Iran’s cooperation with Russia and is it actually do the Middle Eastern countries actually assess Iran Iranian and Russian uh relations as a problem to the region or globally they do it’s uh so this is a third or actually how how many lens did we speak about now about four maybe this is the fifth one um the Iranian Saudi rival if you wish in the region um these are two Rising Powers uh Iran’s frame itself as the leader of what it calls the access of resistance um and resistance to what it’s it’s resistance mainly to Western influence in the region but resistance also to uh what they they call colonialism Etc and um this is a coalition of um primarily a state actor which is Iran but also substate actors so organizations that have very um a veto over the state you know in a way that they don’t rule so they’re not accountable they’re not government they’re not elected but they have veto matters over National Security issues over military and defense Affairs uh they have their own foreign policy and so on so the the prime example of this is hisbah um Lebanese um armed organization that has partial representation in the parliament um and has also uh various other civilian activities but it’s a force to be reckoned with somewhere between 50,000 um active or regulars um and another 50,000 reserves uh plus rocket artillery U plus other uh combat branches that are quite established uh and Iran play that mod model multiple times now we see it as well in in Yemen with theis so a non-state force with significant uh ballistic and cruise and loitering munition capabilities um but also with in places like Iraq with the battalions hisbah battalions kah who also another armed organizations but also there are others as well um so that that model uh on one end is very close to Russia the in terms of the the support in terms of the um high level coordination in the case of Syria specifically and they actually kept the regime kept a very weak regime of Bashar that was about to collapse in 2015 but with the Russian intervention from the air and Brigade sized um mix of of infantry Naval infantry air defense and other way and other aspects um Brigade size formation I mean add to it a um a lot of Iranian supported and Iran Iranian finan militias with leadership from the Iranian revolutionary guard um managed to keep the regime managed to to to in a way partly win in Syria not totally win but partly win in Syria and and keep the regime in the at least in in the uh in some of the urban centers in the big ones um versus the other end the the Saudis uh and their allies that they don’t want to see that Iranian influence surrounding them in in one way and therefore wants to undermine um that influence by any means including trying to place this this wedge between the Iranians and the and the Russians and separate uh the their geostrategic AIMS in a way um I’m not sure they will be that successful um Iran has been playing quite a long game um although we see we see holdes in that game so the the most recent hold is that most of the equipment advertised like some of the Russian equipment uh is not accurate it’s not accurate and it’s quite susceptible to counter measures uh so when you send 330 Airborne Munitions 170 um uh uh loitering munitions suicide drones 120 ballistics and over over 20 crws um and then about somewhere between seven and 14 only land and make it through the air defenses while Regional allies including the US the UK some Arab countries air defending Israel then your Coalition on one end doesn’t look good and also if you’re trying to send the Strategic signal that your weapons long range weapons are effective that doesn’t look good as well so they have as well some some holes in the game but they um if we looked at the controlling multiple um Arab Capitals in s Yemen Beirut Lebanon Baghdad Iraq Damascus Syria uh without taking responsibility of the government you know without without being accountable to the people taking it via substate actors uh substate armed actors militias very well actually the the militias is is doesn’t describe the the the military capabilities of some of these groups uh but taking control via exerting this influence is a is a very effective way it’s a very similar way to um um the lnr and the DNR in the in the case of except that the lnr and DNR actually separated pieces of the country um and wanted to it’s an identist project right they wanted to uh join uh the Russian Federation but Russia invested in them to regain it was a Russian lead operation basically from the from 2014 um so actually in a way the Russians are following the Iranian model and learning and I I at one point I was was notes taken from the Middle East I think both from the case of Isis which is another story uh but but also from the case of uh how to exert influence via a series of substate actors with very strong military capabilities and therefore undermine your enemy in an irregular uh Warfare strategy so you mentioned that Russia is learning from Iran and you mentioned also Isis so let’s uh go a little bit deeper into your uh your research your book that you’ve published uh how Isis fights military tactics in Iraq Syria Libya and Egypt where uh which was presented as far as I understand uh not long ago in Ukraine as well and was published in Ukrainian in the Ukrainian uh language so uh you compare Russian tactics in Ukraine you were stating that Russian tactics in Ukraine resemble uh terrorist extreme extremist strategies Isis in particular so could you please elaborate a little bit on what exactly what what what what resemblance do you see so the the story goes back to Ukraine in 2016 I was um I was doing this project on how the the smaller side the weaker side state or not non-state fights back and part of the project I wanted to to understand how ukrainians uh fought back especially in the very very first counter offensive people they forget that the first counter offensive happened in the summer of 2014 you took back the Sloans katur marup and and other areas other towns and and regions um so I was in 2016 trying to understand you know how Crimea happened and and also the the summer counter offensive of 2014 I was talking to some of the soldiers who were who who served in Crimea and they were describing what happened in Crimea and I was thinking this is what they’re telling me is the exact I heard that story before that’s the exact story of how uh Isis the the organ the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and and Sham now is um had taken the city of rqa in September 2013 was they had series of false front civilian organizations a series of infiltrations uh of the security and the military structures uh in the case of raka it was for the rebels uh in the case of cria it was for the official security establishment the series of propaganda psychological and information operations to um misinform and recruit as much as possible from the public to your side and then a series of assassinations uh kidnappings um uh destabilization operations uh that that kept on occurring to more or less create this societal uh uh frictions and and societ and discohesion social discohesion um and then when you destabilize as much you just use the force to secure the victory because you already got the victory the situation is already collapsing uh to your benefit and then you just secure the force secure the victory with with a conventional force and the the the Isis did not have the you know the the large amphibious Landing or air assault operations that happened in in Crimea one of the largest in the history of Eastern Europe since 1945 but they had mainly technicals and technicals are pickup civilian pickup trucks with uh with uh heavy machine guns uh on them so they give you kind of mobility and Firepower they don’t give you enough protection um so you have they did that in in Raa 2013 and the Russians did a similar case with securing the victory in Crimea after that stabilization intense hybrid Warfare operation Isis style um in uh in Crimea in January and then by March you know they they they Annex the most important geostrategic region uh perhaps in the south of Ukraine uh with almost no costs with a cost them one uh one militia man you know that’s uh that’s that’s about it um you know you want to compare it to the conventional you know when they fight the their casualties now according to the uh to to the UK int Military Intelligence recent report north of 415,000 between death and wounded so casualties well death wounded uh PS and U missing and defected so north of 14 415,000 um are are the Russian casualties versus one in the case of Crimea um so but it’s not just that then you have the the beheadings that that happened you have the the um the intense usage of IEDs of improvised exposive devices in areas that have no military value why would you leave over 18,000 according to the uh Ukrainian emergency service uh over 18,000 IEDs uh ordinance unexploded bombs in places like children pars people’s homes just in keep lost just to do damage while you so you’re covering your retreat by planting all these um iids to make sure that um inflict as much damage as possible and to make sure that you you not followed very IIs to do um they pretty much did the same thing in in U in at at least the four countries that I delve deep in the in the study of how the Isis fights there in Iraq Syria Libya and Egypt uh but then you you have the the weaponization of of sexual V of sexual violence and rape which is also a very Isis styled way of warfare um which has happened as as we know in kblast Chast now we’re discovering moreon and definitely we know more when Mar and areas of of the of D and Lans will be liberated um so we have uh so so if you put this picture together um this is a way of this is a way of warfare basically way of warfare is designed to destabilize the enemy uh as fast as possible with measures that are will be criminal uh will be would constitute war crimes uh but they’re cheap and they’re effective and once you destabilize enough and you inflict enough Terror whether by psychological operations and information operations uh sexual violence uh ID Warfare kidnapping assassinations um and then also check the public via false flag operation false flag um organizations civilian organizations um militias and so on then you secure this by Victory so this is a a a way of warfare that is hybrid that is effective but also uh it commits a series of war crimes and it’s definitely yeah I see it now way more clearly we do understand that Russia is a terrorist State and there is even a hashtag in the social media Russia is a terrorist state but the comparison itself to Isis I find it quite interesting because I have never actually uh thought about it before thank you very much Dr Omar asur for this insightful and valuable discussion I believe that now our audience understands uh the developments in the Middle Eastern region way better well I certainly do now thank you mer very much for finding time to to talk to us and talking substance my pleasure thank you very much Ela for having me andava this was talking substance thank you very much for staying with us in this episode please do not forget to like subscribe and comment on this episode [Music]

In this new episode of “Talking Substance” host Alina Hrytsenko and Dr Omar Ashour, Professor of Security & Military Studies at the Doha Institute, Director of Strategic Studies at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, delve into the intricate dynamics between the Middle East and the Russian-Ukrainian War. This episode sheds light on the multifaceted relationships, geopolitical implications, and regional reverberations resulting from the ongoing conflict.

You can also listen to the Podcast on:
Spotify – https://open.spotify.com/show/30xG74sKQgAUO9UHBUVrAO
Apple Podcasts – https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/talking-substance/id1733022515

Chapters:
00:00 Intro
00:56 Сurrent powerful players in the Middle East after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan
14:43 How has the Russian-Ukrainian war potentially altered Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards the US
18:00 Are the Middle Eastern countries regions neutral in the Russian-Ukrainian war
29:11 Is Zelensky’s Jewish background a problem for Arab states?
33:35 How the Middle Eastern countries assess Iran-Russia relations
42:03 The resemblance between Russian tactics in Ukraine and ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt
49:43 End

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