Ukraine’s target list for new NATO weapons puts Putin’s invasion at risk | Frontline

Ukraine’s target list for new NATO weapons puts Putin’s invasion at risk | Frontline

I would say crime a is is up for grabs and if um Ukraine gets all the kit that it needs um that it’s coming through now it might be in a in a better position to do that and if it gets you know the Ukraine Iron Dome we’ve been talking about and gains their superiority then yeah again it’s another bit of the jigsaw making it more lightly so I wouldn’t write off primary at this stage the very latest top secret aams missiles uh which are um basically Precision guided up to about 3 to 400 km um are already in in the theater of warfare so they already have those we’ve already heard about them attacking airfields in crier they attacking uh depth positions in Russia which is having an impact the rest of it um again we understand quite a lot of it is also positioned forward so um it should get there relatively quickly and you know but by gosh it is needed um very welcome and of course let’s not forget also that Britain announced half a billion 500 million pounds worth of Aid recently which significantly included more Storm Shadow missiles these are a bit like attacks very long range and and very important that the the Russians don’t seem to be able to knock them down with their current air defense so so some significant things happening but but uh you know it is a very challenging picture that we’re seeing in Ukraine at the moment and and of what is included in the aid package and we don’t know the you know full shopping list as it were is it the attacks that you think will be the most crucial well the attacks are what we call a strategic weapon in other words they have the opportunity to hit strategic targets these are targets that can have a demonstrative effect on the way that the Russian wages war and particularly the sort of logistic support So attacking the rail hubs the roads Bridges I think it’s it’s no secret that Ukraine intends to take out the kers bridge the main Bridge from Russia into Crimea where a lot of um their military hardware flows so that is why the attacks is so crucial but also it’s just the amount of artillery ammunition and tank ammunition which Ukraine has been you know really suffering with not having I mean the Russians are firing 10 artill IRS to every one Ukrainian at the moment and you know as we’ve discussed before and as we’re seeing on the front you know Mass has a real quality of its own and you know although we thought this was sort of first world war type um uh uh usage rates actually the trench warfare in the dbass is virtually similar virtually no difference to the trench warfare in passionale and the Som you know well over a 100 years ago so yeah just that weight of ammunition is key as well as well as the smart stuff do you think we will see a major new Russian ground offensive in the coming weeks there is a school of thought that they will try and do it in the next few weeks partly because of the ground conditions but also partly because all of the US military a may not have been provided by that point well C certainly what is happening on the front lines and has been happening over the last few months is a real concern you know the Russians have got 600,000 troops you know aliit not very well- trained troops but again mass is important um and they are really pushing we mentioned abka and bakut where they’ve made advances you know ad defa they’ve they’ve made about 10 kilometers now one of the concerning things that I have been writing about a lot in the last few weeks is they are uh the precursor to a lot of their attacks is is a huge amount of use of Cs gas riot control agent a sort of improvised chemical weapon it does sound unbelievably simple and uh something we shouldn’t be worried about but actually it’s having a huge impact um there are Reuters did an investigation and as did the telegraph really the extent of this and in simple terms um by throwing a lot of Cs gas into the Ukrainian trenches um the Ukrainian servicemen don’t have respirators or certainly don’t have respirators gas masks that actually work so they’re then abandoning the positions and the Russians are following up with armored attacks and conventional attacks and this is how they seem to be making ground um and you know that builds confidence in the Russians and you know it’s morale sapping for the ukrainians so and with the ground now drying out um there is a concern that in the short term absolutely the Russians might try and and push really hard until some of that Hardware goes I think also very interesting to note this week that um the ukrainians have withdrawn some of their Western tanks from the front line particularly the Abrams um first of all because uh they they have become under significant attack from these fpv drones these uh very cheap $500 drones with sort of hand grenades on them that literally fly through open hatches um so that is a concern on the one hand but but I think it is probably more likely that Ukraine is trying to uh develop a mobile armored defense so that if there is a break through then they can counter it but um yeah it’s a tense time if if ukrainians can hold on for the next sort of month or so then they should be restocked and conversely no doubt the Russians are looking at it but I think the Russian ability to conduct what we call combined arms maneuver that’s tanks that’s air power and artillery and infantry all working together is pretty limited because you need to train you know this takes you know if it was a British Army at like my you know when ice Commander the first all tank regim we did a year or two years of training before we’d go into the front line in somewhere like Iraq or Afghanistan so what the Russians are doing giving people a couple of days training one’s you know not very confident that they can do this but again they will throw as they call it throw more soldiers into the meat grinder in the dbass and hopefully make make um progress that way so yeah I think I think the early summer the next sort of six to eight weeks are are going to be crucial and if Ukraine can hold on then then I think everybody’s a bit more confident but but it could be touch and go um but one would expect to see the ukrainians doing a lot more deep strike we’ve discussed the attacks we discussed the Storm Shadow and that really is they can cut off the supply lines uh for the Russians then the Russians will run out of ammunition so yeah it’s going to be a tense time we need to watch it very closely it’s really interesting what you said there heish about the Russian use of of Cs gas on the line what realistically could Ukraine do to counter that I mean does it fundamentally come down to the supply of things like gas masks absolutely there there is a very simple solution to this and um uh and actually in in writing about it with support from the uh ex defense secretary Ben Wallace and also um Bob cely another MP who’s head of the Ukraine all party group uh we tried to be um suggesting to the UK government that actually they could provide gas Mas because that that would end this threat um CS gas only lasts for a couple of minutes but it is deeply unpleasant um and you know i’ I’ve seen the use of basic toxic chemicals like chlorine in Syria being very very effective um for an unprotected soldiers or unprotected civilians it can be devastating so so that CS gas use could be counted if we could get you know the the right amount of gas Mas the front line in short order and you know hopefully people are are working on that but but let let’s not um let’s not let the Russians off the hook here this is viewed as a chemical Weapon by the chemical weapons convention it is illegal under the Geneva Convention and the chemical weapons Convention as and it is in effect a war crime and the Russians should be called out for using this Dreadful weapon ask you heish about how realistic you think it is for Ukraine to one day recapture Crimea I was speaking yesterday on front lines Michael ban who’s who’s been with the times since 1972 as a foreign correspondent columnist leader writer he knows his stuff and he was quite pessimistic about Ukraine ever recapturing Crimea and I put the counterargument that if you look at the success that Ukraine has had at eliminating much of the Black Sea Fleet if you look at the way they’ve been targeting the kersch bridge that actually it may not necessarily be out of the question where where do you stand on that well this is a really interesting point um I think what uh Ukraine is has done is in in military terms we we call it preparing the battlefield so from a strategic perspective preparing the battlefield to attack Crimea has gone pretty well they have hit a lot of targets deep in Crimea a lot of airfields taken down a lot of um some of the Russians top fighter jets and bombers um they have made a lot of them move out of Crimea and they’ve interdicted a lot of um refineries ammunition dumps not only in crime but but also in Russia um we know the Kirch bridge is is um is probably the Achilles Hill of Russia um it’s it’s so much in the sights for Ukraine to attack and so likely that it it will do at some stage that that would really cut the head off the crier snake now as you mentioned the Black Sea fleet has gone there is no um virtually no Naval pres presence in the Black Sea now which gives Ukraine freedom of maneuver W which will be critical the the big question is could they break through the sovin line the defensive lines which have been so difficult at the moment um and if they can I think yes they certainly could take Crimea um and whether you know whether that will help Quicken the end of the war or not is a case to to to consider but I I don’t think taking crime a is completely out of the question and um you know it it could be a very key sort of um element in the future uh to to to get some sort of meaningful peace so yeah I I would say crime a is is up for grabs and if um Ukraine gets all the kit that it needs um that it’s coming through now it might be in a in a better position to do that and if it gets you know the Ukraine Iron Dome we’ve been talking about and gains their superiority then yeah again it’s another bit of the jigsa making it more lightly so I wouldn’t write off primier at this stage key piece of information that that’s come out since this Aid bill was passed is that the long range us attacks had secretly been supplied to Ukraine and had been used on two occasions against the Russian Airfield in Crimea on the 17th of April and Russia’s claiming to have shot down more destined to Crimea since um what kind of threat do they pose on the battlefield and do you think this is a pattern that’s going to be repeated targeting crime well these aams have a much longer range than the previous version that they were given last October um this version has a range out to about 300 kilm we believe we’re not quite sure which variance that were given but it’s probably a mix of the unitary Warhead which is one big Warhead and the cluster munition which is lots and lots of submunitions um what this will permit the ukrainians to do is Target Russian operational targets and when I say operational targets these are targets that aren’t engaged in direct combat now uh and aren’t you know back in Russia there’re somewhere in between its headquarters its Logistics nodes its Reserve troop locations and the aim is to ensure if the ukrainians do have to engage in ground combat they’re doing it in a much leveler playing field than what they’re doing now that they’re able to kill as many Russians and Destroy as much as they artillery before they’re actually able to engage in Grand combat which is very similar to the airlane battle concept that NATO used in the Cold War so are we talking about potential targets deep inside Crimea perhaps the kch bridge as well well certainly uh most of Crimea can be held at risk I think airfields I think Logistics nodes uh kers Bridge might be part that headquarters but also in Southern and Eastern Ukraine so it allows the ukrainians to Target every square cimer of their territory which is being occupied by the Russians which was not the case before now it’s also worth noting that the eight tachs has uh some fairly clever tricker involved which allows it to degrade the ability of Russian air defenses to intercept them uh so that’s another reason why these things are very important in the Ukrainian Armory the moment right now uh the Russians will know there’s a small window before uh Ukraine reaps the benefits of this military aid arriving what options will it be weighing up well it’ll be up you know how much can it throw at the ukrainians right now I mean it hasn’t gone through another mobilization process we’re expecting that they will but they still able to recruit 25 to 30,000 uh you know generally replaces their losses and a little bit more so they will be uh getting as many forces comat as they can right now while the ukrainians are what at what the Russians think while the ukrainians are at their weakest um we should recall we thought the ukrainians weren’t going to hold out very long in 2022 and they achieved amazing things so you know we shouldn’t be writing them off uh but the Russians are doing things like moving first line uh parachute divisions vdv units from the south to the east at the moment which is an indication that the East will be their and it’s where the Russians think they have the greatest chance of making some kind of significant breakthrough you’re recently back from Ukraine your fourth visit in 18 months what can you tell us about your visit well I think I have to uh kind of say up front that I was there just before the US supplemental was pass so uh my my insights I guess are Guided by that um you know the ukrainians are are fatigued and frustrated at that point in time particularly with the US Congress but I think too that you know the last six months you’ve seen the counter offensive fail you saw the zi zalinsky civil military crisis you saw uh the debate over the mobilization bill which is just been passed but with thousands of amendments um so you know I think after 27 months Fair enough the ukrainians are pretty pretty fatigued and um you know it’s hard to see a light at the tunnel at the moment that isn’t a Russian Armored Division uh so you know that is kind of the sense I got it’s not defeated uh it’s just you know a grim realization that this is going to take some time and as you say it it was before that momentous 61 billion US dollar Aid de deal was was pass and was agreed and signed off by President Biden can you just tell me a little bit more about what the purpose of your visit were was who did you meet and what were you doing exactly well each of my visits have had two purposes one to talk to a variety of military and government officials as well as think tanks and journalists to get a sense of where the war is and its potential trajectories uh but the second purpose is about learning about Ukraine I mean it’s it’s a a real Revelation for me from the bottom of the world Ukraine is in a country a lot of lot of Australians know a lot about so it has a dual purpose every time this time got to speak to pretty senior military and government officials at the ministerial level National Security advisor to president salinski to get a a fairly holistic view of where the war is at um and where it might be trending at the moment and what did they tell you well they told us lots of different things some things in confidence some things happy to share but you know one of the important insights is you know what is Ukraine’s theory of Victory one of our senior interlocutor sigo what does winning this look like for Ukraine and I think that is an excellent question that’s probably a question only the ukrainians can answer but it’s one that the West should help them with uh both in formulating what that looks like and then helping them with the real resources to win it we had some very interesting conversations with a minister for strategic Industries very Dynamic a very competent Minister who’s really managed to turn around indigenous defense production in Ukraine tripled it in 2022 doubled it again last year it’s at the point now where they have more capacity than they can fund uh weapons for so that’s a pretty good place to be in uh most Western countries are nowhere near that in their defense product um and we had the opportunity to talk with bunch of students at K of University to to go to a very different kind of audience um you know most of them were in uniform go to a Western University that would never be the case but in Ukraine you have young students who are both training to be in the military and training their minds as University students it kind of reminds you that uh this is a societal fight it’s not like the wars that I participated in Iraq and Afghanistan where a very small proportion of the country went back and did multiple tours and everyone else went on with their lives Ukraine is a country that has been fundamentally changed because everyone in some degree is part of the war effort or has a relative who is when you say Mick um that one of the the interesting conversations you had was about what victory what winning the war looked like with those senior figures did you get a feeling of that there was a consensus of what that is well I think you know there’s a consensus on the key elements the most important bit is defeating Russia Ukraine uh the narrative from Western politicians that you know we need to defend Ukraine or where is in in it for as long as it takes pretty meaning meaningless uh what we really need is a statement of intent which is about beating Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine it’s not about defeating Russia as a nation or regime change or any of those things it’s about defeating Russia and Ukraine and Ukraine getting back to it 91 borders you you also described this uh constant D drum beats of the escalation of Terror by the West in this war their fear that um sending some of the weapons that Ukraine needs at the time it crucially needs those weapons is in some way going to escalate in the way that that that we are fearful of has that attitude changed I’m not sure that it has I think our risk tolerance might have increased a bit I think the recent comments by French president Marron have been very interesting and I really like that version of President mron we’re seeing at the moment because he’s probably the first Western leader that’s kind of forced Putin to think oh wow someone’s talking about NATO boots on the ground they haven’t done that before but all the way through this war we’ve seen this escalation teror it’s like oh we can’t give them artillery then we give them artillery oh we can’t give them tanks then we give them Tanks i me we’re going to do it let’s just do it and do it in a way that’s speedy and and allows this stuff to have an uh rather than kind of being a lagging capability I think a really important indicator of um how fearful some governments are of escalation at the moment is the most recent us statements that China has crossed a red line on the amount of dual use Technologies it’s providing to Russia in this war and that it has to stop it so I think you know we’ll see out of the Biden Administration is it willing to put its money where its mouth is uh with China Crossing those red lines or is it going to take the Obama Administration approach lays out red lines and when the adversary crosses them it just looks the other way what kind of action would you like the Biden ad Administration to take if it if China does continue to cross those red lines in supporting Russia well I think there’s there’s more I can do on the technology front um you know you got to wonder how how many other American companies might be Ed from dealing with although a lot of them at the moment are leaving of their own Val because of um some of the laws that China brought in in the last few years so you know the Americans are probably going to have to be pretty creative in this because as we’ve seen sanctions against Russia have hurt them a bit but they haven’t had the full impact that we’d hope they would I think too that you know the US will be looking at those who export other high Technologies to China and and might be twisting some arms there but at the end of the day it’ll be up to the Biden Administration to decide whether it wants to act need have cross these red lines and then of course whatever comes afterwards after November um finally something something that’s very pertinent to you the potential expansion of the orus military partnership uh of Australia the UK and us to include South Korea as a pillar two partner as I understand it that would not mean it’s it mean it’s not involved in the provision of conventionally armed nuclear power submarines but more the development of things like Hypersonic uh missiles underwater drones Cyber Technology um this of course is deployed by uh president x what effect do you think this potential expansion will have in the region and why is it expanding I think it’d be a great move uh and of course the Chinese would hate it because they want to deal with each country individually they don’t want to deal with alliances because they know together we’re much stronger than them um you know we saw recent speculation that Japan might join the of orcus I think that would be a fabulous move they have an enormously sophisticated Broad and deep research and development uh capacity that uh outstrips uh Australia certainly potentially Britain as well they would bring an enormous amount to orcus pillar 2 and let’s not forget they’ve been a very responsible International citizen for many many decades since the end of the second World War I think are in the same boat uh they’re responsible International citizen uh both Australia and the US in particular had very close and significant trading relationships with Korea I think for Australia it’s our second or third largest trading and once again they have a very sophisticated R&D uh capacity and they bu design and build their own submarines warships aircraft armored vehicles so I think they bring a lot to it really it gets down to the security around that uh sharing of Technology uh but politically I think it makes all sense in the world I said I said then finally but I just have one last question um to what extent do you think what is happening in Ukraine right now and how the next 12 24 months uh uh roll out will impact the security and what happens and the attitudes to to your part of the world I think it has a few impacts first and foremost you’re seeing Ukraine as as a huge battle lab for new technologies that are going to spin off allthough um you know one example is we saw Iran use exactly the same kind of tactics against Israel a couple of weeks ago that Russia’s been using with its drone and missile attacks against Ukraine that’s just one example I think you’ll see other examples when it comes to information Warfare the use of drones and things like that now Ukraine and the indopacific very different uh terrain weather uh geography and politics but I think there are enough lessons there about leadership about strategic decision making about industrial bases that they will translate into the indopacific very well there have been symbolic attacks on Moscow uh we’ve had drones that have actually hit buildings and done something but we haven’t had widespread casualties or anything like that and I don’t think the average Russian um does really feel that the war is all around them of course the average young person does worry that any moment now they may be recruited into the military and that is a very real real threat and particularly uh the uh Elite youth as it were in Moscow and Petersburg uh either they’ve fled or they’re hoping that the um military recruitment will not pick them up because that could cause a lot of upset in influence places and do you think puin will do that at some point or do you think he’d be reluctant to because of the internal unrest it would cause if if he does for example conscript younger more middle class um uh people you know from the big cities of of Moscow and St Petersburg well so far he has been very reluctant to do that which suggests he would still be reluctant it depends how urgently they need more forces depends how Reckless they are with their own casualties I mean they have a very poor record of saving lives on the front line they just throw in wave after wave I mean some of them they say well these were prisoners you know these were people who uh they they they took the bargain you know they would be free if they joined up and and fought on the front line and uh they got killed well that was their choice as it were um they are trying to induce people into the armed services by paying enormous amounts of money I mean six times the average wage for those who join up and Promises to their families if they are killed or if they are injured uh well that will that might keep up some of the flow of recruits but actually military conscription a new wave of conscription Putin has been reluctant to do that and will it depends how how tough the situation gets for Russia whether they will or or need to do that we have heard since the start of the fullscale invasion fears about puin potentially using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine fears about some major escalation so far that hasn’t come to pass how would you assess that risk yes well the risk is there but I I think the the Russians are under pretty pretty strict uh restrictions both from their main Ally China who’s warned them several times publicly as well as privately don’t you think of using nuclear weapons because the Chinese know that you know then World War II starts or you know absolutely uncontrollable consequences if they start doing that uh and equally I think public opinion within Russia would be very hostile to the idea of nuclear weapons that could expose Russians also to a Counterattack now as for the Germans feeling that they are getting involved by having um people on the ground helping man these missiles well that is a perfectly real fear and it’s not unreasonable because actually several countries have clandestinely put their own experts on the ground to help Ukraine uh either train or you know use or launch or do whatever they need to do with weapons with which the ukrainians are not familiar and there have been reports that quite a number of undercover Western military advisers or actually experts on the ground with ukrainians um the Russians are well aware of that the Russians have uh tried to uh stop that by bombing supply lines or targeting uh ammunition dumps where these things are delivered inside Ukraine but it’s a bit difficult for them because U the Western governments have all denied that they’re officially uh entering into a direct armed so iation with Ukraine they’re saying we’re simply supplying you know what they need in terms of weapons and defense but inevitably um there are people on the ground yeah and and I suppose The crucial question is is it possible for Ukraine to win this war without escalating the conflict that’s a very good question I mean it depends how you define winning uh is it possible for them to get back all the territory now occupied by Russia frankly the answer is no it’s not going to happen they’re not going to get the Russians particularly out of Crimea uh and actually I’m not sure for all their talk whether the West really will push ukrainians into open you know fullscale War to the point where they’ve got the Russians retreating back behind the 19 uh 2014 Frontiers in other words withdrawing from crier um the West was fairly mute when the Russians occupied crier partly because there was a sort of feeling that crier actually historically has always been Russian it was only in 1954 that krof signed it over to Ukraine uh and in those days didn’t matter it was all the same country it was all part of the Soviet Union so there isn’t that sort of feeling that Ukraine must go on all the way to win now Victory could mean less than getting all the territory back it could show mean simply showing Moscow that they have failed in their objective of subordinating the entire country to Moscow that most of Ukraine is free and independent and will not NE necessarily do what Moscow wants and that could be a real definition of Victory and it could indeed be very damaging to Putin is it unrealistic though for Ukraine to recapture crime because there would be some who say look at the success that Ukraine a country essentially without a Navy has had at eliminating much of the the Black Sea Fleet uh obviously has targeted the kurch bridge in the past if they were able to destroy or partially destroy the kch bridge that would be a severe blow to Russia is it really out of the question they could retake Crimea no it’s not out of the question question I just think it’s politically more difficult for them to persuade the Allies to back them to a fullscale assault getting the all Russian forces out of Kier you’re right they have had enormous success unexpected success almost uh in their Naval operations uh they’ve managed to Target Russian sips they’ve sunk quite a few they’ve forced the Russians to with treat withdraw from uh the ports in uh Crimea Sasol in particular move further east to Russian ports the other side of the um of the of the the water there uh I think that the Russians would double down enormously if they really thought the Crimea itself was actually about to be retaken I think they would launch everything they’ve got to make sure that doesn’t happen but in terms of being able to hit Russian forces uh the ukrainians have been quite successful particularly with their longer range missiles at hitting ammunition dumps at hitting strategic uh uh Supply points and and also Russian bases and tactically do you think we will see that continue from Ukraine particularly with the provision now of these attacks again from the US that they will go after some of the energy infrastructure that Russia has whilst obviously trying to defend their positions on the front line undoubtedly I mean that would be the sensible thing to do I mean I’m sure that’s what their military advisers would would tell them to do uh and they need to Target uh the airfields and the bases where a lot of Russian attacks are launched from they need to actually hit energy infrastructures in the same way that the Russians have done and are still doing in Ukraine yes um but of course again you get to the point where to what extent is are the Western allies ready to allow the ukrainians to use Western weapons for direct assaults on Russia proper beyond the territory that has been occupied uh with are they ready for long range hits say on Moscow or wherever they might try to uh I think the answer is the West would be fairly reluctant but wouldn’t that wouldn’t that bring things to a head in a way that may work out in Ukraine’s favor because you know at the moment for many ordinary Russians the war feels quite distant it doesn’t affect their day-to-day lives if there were regular strikes on big Russian cities surely that would increase the pressure internally on Putin yes well I can tell you about one city in particular that I know quite well namely belgrod down in the South where I have spent several years teaching English uh in to two students in belgrod a lovely city it’s um it’s a sort of medium-sized Town neither Rich neither poor neither big neither small it’s a a typical quite quite well-to-do southern town and they have had uh attacks on them and people have been killed and they they are quite worried and upset and scared and they it does come home to them very much in a big way there Trump’s Central arguments actually that he’s been making over recent years although he’s been making it in very crash terms is is right is it not that actually America for too long has basically funded Europe’s defense policy and European countries particularly NATO members need to spend more of their uh overall spending on defense and we’re starting to see moves in that direction but but Trump is right on that point isn’t he oh yes that I think there’s no question about that the Europeans have all heard that message and reacted to it that’s not quite the same as helping Ukraine I mean what Trump is saying is that European membership of NATO is dependent on them paying their share and even if they pay uh 2% or more than 2% even then America will still pay by far the largest share of the running costs of NATO and all the equipment and well everything uh America will still have a much larger share and in absolute terms a far higher amount of money will be paid in by the Americans uh but the Europeans have heard that message and they’ve been saying it themselves you know we really ought to to um up our game a bit and particularly those that are below 2% which include big countries such as Germany I mean Germany’s made a big commitment that they will increase their defense budget but you know it it needs to be increased pretty quickly and then some other countries that have really thought that defense doesn’t matter terribly much you know countries that have sort of prly far away and and fairly peaceful well um for example Spain and Portugal or even some of the Southern European countries in NATO they don’t see the urgency or haven’t seen the urgency but I think they will see it now uh the only countries that have really seen it and have seen it for some time are those in Eastern Europe close to the I mean Poland for example has been far well exactly almost double what Britain uh pays not in terms of money but in terms of uh per percentage per head yeah uh that is a lot uh and they see the urgency straight away and Britain has always been fairly far out front but I have to say even Britain’s contribution has relatively declined in the past uh 10 or 15 years you know the peace dividend as it was called seems to have been that we we the Army is well below Force we’ve got uh real problems with uh equipment we haven’t got enough we’ve not manufactured things that work been spending a lot of money on tanks and make all those in it go deaf so I mean not very successful record so far Russian sources have claimed that Ukraine conducted a short range attack him strike against targeting crime on on Monday night do you see crime is the soft underbelly of Russia’s war effort that if you can undermine crime if you can destroy or damage further the kersch bridge if you can continue to strike Targets in Crimea that is where Putin is at his weakest absolutely currently there’s two soft underbells of the Russian Empire one is Brians K belgar those regions uh because whenever they launch missiles at uh Ukrainian citizens from the territory of belg for example uh they receive a response and uh people who uh live in belr they realize that um it’s a game that two parties can play right and uh it’s as dangerous to shoot ukrainians uh for themselves as well and this is why they react and and uh basically we really hope that they will be wise enough to uh call their authorities to stop this Insanity uh but unfortunately with Russia is not the case and of course the second uh soft underbelly is uh crimeia because we know that with losing Crimea Putin will most probably lose his life as well um that’s why uh these strikes on strategic objects will continue and of course uh uh we expect that with the Ukrainian Army uh gaining access to assor Sea at least uh the the future of so-called Russian crimeia will be under big big question so uh yes and on the um tactics that that we’ve seen from Ukraine of late have you noticed any significant shift in tactics since General seski replaced General zi or have they been following broadly speaking the same tactical objectives uh well currently we are talking about defensive actions about active defense uh and it it didn’t change much um so because of the ammunition starvation let’s call it this way uh we don’t have much choice but to defend our positions and if we cannot do that we should slowly move back inflicting as much casualties to the Russian personnel as possible uh this is exactly what we saw in places like ABA for example um and this is what we see in several other spans of the front line um not much uh time passed I think uh to to to talk about the differences in tactics but at the same time the commanders of the brigades on the level of brigades uh they’re the same they didn’t change they know their uh location they know their their ground uh and uh I I don’t think that we will see uh any dramatic changes uh in the current tactics you mentioned atifa there obviously we have seen further incremental gains by the Russians in and around aivar over recent weeks How concerned are you about that um there were several uh concerning cases recently but um with the uh Aid coming to the Ukrainian Defenders I’m sure that we will be able to deal with them how would you say moral is among Ukrainian troops at the moment uh well again because of this American Aid uh was approved uh the morale is boosting the morale is rising which is good uh I talked to different guys they always they they all say that uh we we we cannot wait uh until we receive our uh hiters or shells um so the other problem is of for exhaustion of the troops because uh I keep saying this the guys keep fighting for more than two years already and they feel exhausted uh but this is uh the price we have to pay for our freedom I think and just finally operator Stasi I asked this question of of heish to Breton Gordon yesterday and I’ll ask it of you as well because I think it’s insightful what would constitute a successful May we’re speaking out at the start of what would constitute a successful month of May for Ukraine and of the war we all expect expect and uh this war to end tomorrow like literally but realistically speaking of course we understand that it’s impossible and it will end in several more years which is more realistic uh we know that Russia is capable of fighting for the next two or four years uh according to different sources like Institute for studying Warfare for example um successful May for us is uh I think uh probably increasing defense on our positions uh building new lines of defenses because this is this is something very important and Cann not be ignored uh and then uh concentrating new resources for a new counter offense even though things have been incredibly stretched for Ukraine on the front line given the lack of supplies in recent months Ukraine has still had remarkable success at using long rrange missiles to Target some of those Russian energy uh infrastructure pieces uh yeah and not only missiles also drones um uh another thing that we have to mention here is that uh of course Ukraine uses plenty of different types of drones uh on a tactical level on operative level but um Russians also use uh electronic warfare machines to suppress those drones and this is why artillery uh like primitive common artillery is so much useful uh at the front lines to uh strike Uh Russian personnel and uh Russian vehicles and uh ammo storages and uh command po how long do you think it will be until the full impact of this fresh US military aid is actually felt in Ukraine I think it uh depends on the uh time of delivery of this uh Aid to our positions on the first place uh because uh there’s uh already uh plan developed for U our further steps right uh we only need tools to to make it happen so I think uh the first question is delivery and this is uh where we have to expect uh actions from Russian Invaders who will obviously try to disrupt our logistic um Logistics and uh our attempts to supply this Aid to our guys on the front line and I think what we’re all hoping is that the West has not become complacent now that this military aid package has been approved by US Congress hopefully it’ll make a big difference but alone it is not enough and there needs to be more and I’m wondering in particular whether you think for example Germany granting access to the tourist missiles could be the kind of thing that that could actually make a further difference in Ukraine um I think Germany could have done it uh already right if they had political will and uh if um I’m talking about Mr Schultz of course uh if he had political will he would do that already but we don’t see that unfortunately and uh something tells me that it it will never happen we won’t see taus missiles in Ukraine um we will see uh I believe other uh kinds of support and uh military aid uh there are already uh factories being built factories for producing artillery shells because likely our allies realized that this is very important uh nowadays for Ukrainian Defenders uh but unfortunately this takes a lot of time but on the other hand uh because our allies uh comparing to Russia even that produces plenty of shells on daily basis but uh they are are very strong and um they have very powerful economy again comparing to Russia and they will be able to do that just on the tourist missiles one of the arguments that Olaf Schultz makes against providing them is he says it would be an escalation not only because of how they might be used by Ukraine against Russia but also because he believes it would require German soldiers to be on the ground in Ukraine helping to program the missiles now I know some analysts have disputed that and said that actually you wouldn’t need German soldiers on the ground do you think that Ukraine has has the the expertise already within its forces to program the missiles themselves well since we’re building our own missiles like Neptune for example those missiles that U destroyed Russian Flagship mosa in the Black Sea of course we have capability to program foreign missiles as well the problem is uh lack of political willpower right uh if you really want to do something you’re looking for opportunity if you don’t want to do something you’re looking for reason to justify you’re not doing it and this is exactly what we uh can see because uh we already heard a lot of different reasons from ukrainians not being able to program those missiles to uh I don’t know you know Technologies getting in the hands of Russians and things like that um we must uh I think we we must understand that uh probably there is no uh wheel to pass those missiles to to Ukraine for whatever reason but I think it will not happen and when you hear allies of Ukraine in the west make the argument about not wanting to provoke Russia and escalate things further what do you make of that when you hear that argument because of course it’s very easy for someone who is not living in a country that’s currently being illegally occupied to make that argument and yet it is a legitimate point that no one wants to see Vladimir Putin use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine for example so when you hear people talk about the risk of escalation and not wanting to provoke Russia further what do you make of that uh there are uh two opinions one opinion is uh like escalation is general and it’s one of the Russian narratives that are being spread on the west it’s like uh Russians and ukrainians killing each other you know we should stop escalation because they are killing each other ukrainians are defending because it’s a proper thing to defend your home uh you don’t want to die because somebody just wants to kill you he doesn’t have that right nobody has has we all have right to leave and we we have right to protect ourselves this is what we why we are fighting um and uh another opinion is of course um related to use of nuclear weapons because uh people are afraid that if there is uh a chance that uh Russian army uh will be engaged in direct combat against uh NATO troops this will inevitably lead to a nuclear war um on the other hand you know uh considering the uh intensity of uh talks about using nuclear weapons on a Russian television uh and all the attempts to scare the West uh I think they they understand the price of this and they will never do that of course the foreign aid bill which passed in the US includes $2 billion do towards the foreign military financing program for Taiwan and other security Partners China says it’s pushing the island into a dangerous situation is it and how might China respond well this is a situation that’s been going on for some time and the two M2 billion you just referred to is simply the latest uh installment in uh a very substantial series of Aid packages that the United States has provided to Taiwan in recent years um when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China um they um cancelled a bilateral treaty with Taiwan that effectively required them to provide um security for Taiwan but they introduced to Taiwan another act which uh um committed the uh US government to providing Taiwan with with um military equipment for defensive purposes um that was something that didn’t cause obviously China was not happy with it but it didn’t really cause too much problem I think the issue came into star relief uh around 2017 2018 under the Trump Administration um which began to use Taiwan as a means of putting pressure on China and uh creating irritation the Trump Administration I think provided in total $18 billion dollar worth of military um assistance to Taiwan though it must be said that because of delivery lags a lot of that um uh equipment hasn’t arrived yet um and the Biden Administration has similarly provided a range of military equipment uh to Taiwan so there’s two billion really is the the the most recent uh installment and in a sense I think we can say that China’s objections to this latest TR are in some senses proformer uh but what I think they will do is uh continue and perhaps intensify what they’ve already been doing for six or seven years now which is an intensification of what have been termed Gray Zone uh tactics um uh flights over the so-called median line the Midway line in the Taiwan Strait uh that divides the two um uh entities uh a lot of military uh exercises Naval exercises um in the Taiwan Strait and around um Taiwan uh cyber attacks um information operations cognition Warfare um all of these things have been going on and it’s widely regarded though that China would be militarily ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 how far is it prepared to go in your opinion to exert its claim over the island that in a sense when they say that they are prepared um to um resort to military force to recover the island one has to take this seriously at the same time um it’s quite clear that for now at least um the Chinese government is um more focused on uh peaceful reunification with Taiwan this is not straightforward because the uh party that has um governed Taiwan for the last eight years and will continue to do so um when the presidential Handover takes place um later this month um have um been you regarded by China as promoting Taiwan Independence which for China has always been a red line um but in the recent elections in Taiwan that took place in January this year we saw a situation in which the Democratic People’s Party the DPP the governing party retained the presidency but lost control of the legislature um with a lot of people splitting their votes U precisely in order to bring about this this outcome so um I think China will look at the political situation in in Taiwan and think well if the two main opposition parties had done what they set out to do and uh agreed on a Unity candidate which ultimately failed to materialize they would actually have won the election and at least one of these parties the Guang the kmt um is much more amable at least to talking to China about reunification whereas of course the DPP is not the other thing to pick up on what you said about China being militarily ready by 2027 to take Taiwan I think we need um to make a distinction here between capability and intent uh on the one hand and uh secondly uh to recognize that while by 2027 the Chinese military might actually have most of the equipment that they would need to undertake what would be a very difficult operation um they’re still not sure that they’ve so to speak got the software right you know the the you the the Personnel the military training the ability to put together complex um um integrated um joint operations um Logistics all of these things I think they have reservations still about their own capabilities in this regard your assessment right now is that China does not have the intent it wants to achieve its Ambitions uh via diplomatic means without violence at this stage yes I mean where CH when China looks at the whole Taiwan situation um their military planning is based on a presumption that the United States will come to taiwan’s Aid militarily in the event of conflict the United States posture has been one of iic ambiguity um leaving it open whether or not they would undertake such activity but President Biden has um in the last couple of years said on four occasions that the US would come to taiwan’s assistance in such an event so I think you’ve got to take that that seriously and of course um China obviously is is concerned about the very real risks of getting into a shooting war with the United States um it’s not necessarily the case uh that they would lose this war but equally it’s not necessarily the case they would win it Wars these days tend not to have quick uh and decisive conclusions and what China could find itself getting into is a prolonged um conflict um of Uncertain outcome and I think uh cin ping and any eventual successor if it doesn’t happen under cin ping would be very concerned about the impact for that on the ability of the Chinese Communist party to retain its hold on power not to mention the what do you make then o of reports that have been in a British national newspaper this week that China is stockpiling gold it’s raised suspicions that this is perhaps sanction proofing itself against the US um what do you read into that possible but I think you have to remember that uh the Chinese Communist Party um is a quintessentially paranoid organization and kind of needs to be this is you in their DNA so to speak and for a long time now Sean ping has been talking to the Chinese people about the need for struggle you know the the need to be aware of threats um you know he has identified over 20 areas um um which apply to National Security uh just recently China had uh its National Security day um when when they seek to um raise the awareness of of the population about um the threats that China faces cining has also talked about a very much more um difficult and complex um International situation um the um United States government is now threatening to sanction some Chinese Bank who are seniors having facilitated the sale of um to to Russia of um equipment that Russia is using to rebuild its military capabilities so I think that the the Chinese government is is looking to um um maximize um its resilience uh in the face of threats and interruptions by the same token cin ping um is um making a big um thing of China um achieving self-sufficiency in food production energy and so on so I think this is just another manifestation of that General sense of paranoia you’ve been watching Frontline for times radio with me K chabo my thanks to our producers today Louis syes and Morgan berdick and for you for watching if you’d like to support us you can subscribe now or you can listen to times radio for the latest news and in-depth analysis or go to the times.co.uk for now though thanks for watch watching bye-bye

Putin might be out of time for a last minute offensive before US aid arrives as secret ATACMS deliveries have opened up several key targets for Ukraine to strike. This week’s Frontline guests discuss the latest:

Hamish De Bretton Gordon, Retired British Army Commander
Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan, Retired Australian General
Michael Binyon, Former Times Moscow Correspondent
Operator Starsky, Ukrainian Veteran and Blogger
Nigel Inkster, Former MI5 Director

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