In the period just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, “at the West’s most influential research organizations, prominent analysts—many of them political scientists who follow Russian military affairs—confidently predicted that Russia would defeat its smaller neighbor within weeks,” Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien write. “American military leaders believed this consensus, to the point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair reportedly told members of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a Russian attack …” [https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq](https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq)
“Both of us are military historians who have a keen interest in contemporary strategic issues—and who, at the outset of the war, harbored grave doubts about the prevailing analysis of Russian and Ukrainian capabilities … In a report published this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we sought to understand how prominent military analysts had been so badly wrong. Why did they assume that Russia could successfully conduct an exceedingly complex lightning offensive and win a major war in considerably less time than the Wehrmacht needed to overrun France, a smaller country, in 1940? Why did they persistently take the most negative possible view of Ukraine’s abilities and prospects?
“As we reread scores of articles and reports, listened to podcasts, and reviewed op-eds and interviews, we noticed how little uncertainty had been expressed. Russia, prominent analysts had insisted, had completely modernized its military. Its soldiers were no longer chiefly conscripts but professionals. Its military doctrine—particularly its organization of units into so-called battalion tactical groups, which are small infantry battalions reinforced with tanks and artillery—was a stroke of organizational genius. Its soldiers and airmen had been battle-tested in Syria and earlier operations in Ukraine. The two of us pored over the maps, reprinted widely, that showed half a dozen or more red arrows effortlessly piercing Ukraine up to its western border.
“To the extent that analysts discussed Ukraine in any detail, its citizens were depicted as the demoralized and atomized victims of a corrupt government. The country’s substantial Russophone population was portrayed as largely indifferent to rule from Moscow or Kyiv. Ukraine’s equipment was no match for advanced Russian systems. They had experienced only static warfare in the Donbas and would have no chance against a Russian blitzkrieg. Volodymyr Zelensky was portrayed as an ineffective president. He was a comedy performer, not a wartime leader; his government, intelligence services, and armed forces had been penetrated by Russian spies and saboteurs. Ukrainians might not even put up much of a guerrilla resistance. On top of it all came consistent policy advocacy: assertions that Ukraine was not worth arming or that well-intentioned efforts to do so would merely increase suffering.
“Two and a half years later, the Russians have taken as many as 600,000 casualties; Ukrainian cities have been shattered but still stand, while Ukrainian drones have hit Moscow. Ukrainians have driven the Black Sea Fleet from its anchorages around Crimea, sunk a third of its ships, and freed up sea lanes for the vital export of Ukrainian agricultural products. Ukrainian forces have in the past few weeks seized an area larger than Los Angeles inside the borders of Russia itself.”
“The same expert analytic community that erred early in the war continues to dominate much of the public and governmental discourse,” they continue. Read more here: [https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq](https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq)
Does this article bring up anything new? Or just the quarterly rehash of the same things people have been saying since month two of the war?
Lot of overestimation of Russian capabilities considering their past performance in Chechnya, an 8 year war in Donbas prior to 2022, and numerous reported issues.
I listened to an interview with a long series CIA Officer. He said in the 1980’s they figured out that the Soviet Military was significantly less capable than believed based on their performance in Afghanistan.
He was told that that fact was widely known in the CIA and DIA, but they needed to falsely portray the Soviets as much more capable than they were to justify the defence budget.
Just listened to this guy on the “Ukraine, the latest” podcast. A few bits stood out for me:
1. Think-tanks are pressured by sponsors/media for certainty. Nobody wants to hear unknowns and doubt. Therefore once the “Russian victory” was identified as the likelihood, it quickly snowballed.
2. Ukraine tended to predict the outcomes better than both the West and Russia (understandable). Countries close to Russia/Ukraine also tended to be more accurate (Finland, Baltics, Poland).
3. A lot of expectations were based on performances against much weaker opponents (Russia in Syria, NATO in Lybia).
5 comments
In the period just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, “at the West’s most influential research organizations, prominent analysts—many of them political scientists who follow Russian military affairs—confidently predicted that Russia would defeat its smaller neighbor within weeks,” Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O’Brien write. “American military leaders believed this consensus, to the point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair reportedly told members of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a Russian attack …” [https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq](https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq)
“Both of us are military historians who have a keen interest in contemporary strategic issues—and who, at the outset of the war, harbored grave doubts about the prevailing analysis of Russian and Ukrainian capabilities … In a report published this week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, we sought to understand how prominent military analysts had been so badly wrong. Why did they assume that Russia could successfully conduct an exceedingly complex lightning offensive and win a major war in considerably less time than the Wehrmacht needed to overrun France, a smaller country, in 1940? Why did they persistently take the most negative possible view of Ukraine’s abilities and prospects?
“As we reread scores of articles and reports, listened to podcasts, and reviewed op-eds and interviews, we noticed how little uncertainty had been expressed. Russia, prominent analysts had insisted, had completely modernized its military. Its soldiers were no longer chiefly conscripts but professionals. Its military doctrine—particularly its organization of units into so-called battalion tactical groups, which are small infantry battalions reinforced with tanks and artillery—was a stroke of organizational genius. Its soldiers and airmen had been battle-tested in Syria and earlier operations in Ukraine. The two of us pored over the maps, reprinted widely, that showed half a dozen or more red arrows effortlessly piercing Ukraine up to its western border.
“To the extent that analysts discussed Ukraine in any detail, its citizens were depicted as the demoralized and atomized victims of a corrupt government. The country’s substantial Russophone population was portrayed as largely indifferent to rule from Moscow or Kyiv. Ukraine’s equipment was no match for advanced Russian systems. They had experienced only static warfare in the Donbas and would have no chance against a Russian blitzkrieg. Volodymyr Zelensky was portrayed as an ineffective president. He was a comedy performer, not a wartime leader; his government, intelligence services, and armed forces had been penetrated by Russian spies and saboteurs. Ukrainians might not even put up much of a guerrilla resistance. On top of it all came consistent policy advocacy: assertions that Ukraine was not worth arming or that well-intentioned efforts to do so would merely increase suffering.
“Two and a half years later, the Russians have taken as many as 600,000 casualties; Ukrainian cities have been shattered but still stand, while Ukrainian drones have hit Moscow. Ukrainians have driven the Black Sea Fleet from its anchorages around Crimea, sunk a third of its ships, and freed up sea lanes for the vital export of Ukrainian agricultural products. Ukrainian forces have in the past few weeks seized an area larger than Los Angeles inside the borders of Russia itself.”
“The same expert analytic community that erred early in the war continues to dominate much of the public and governmental discourse,” they continue. Read more here: [https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq](https://theatln.tc/MCr8iAsq)
Does this article bring up anything new? Or just the quarterly rehash of the same things people have been saying since month two of the war?
Lot of overestimation of Russian capabilities considering their past performance in Chechnya, an 8 year war in Donbas prior to 2022, and numerous reported issues.
I listened to an interview with a long series CIA Officer. He said in the 1980’s they figured out that the Soviet Military was significantly less capable than believed based on their performance in Afghanistan.
He was told that that fact was widely known in the CIA and DIA, but they needed to falsely portray the Soviets as much more capable than they were to justify the defence budget.
Just listened to this guy on the “Ukraine, the latest” podcast. A few bits stood out for me:
1. Think-tanks are pressured by sponsors/media for certainty. Nobody wants to hear unknowns and doubt. Therefore once the “Russian victory” was identified as the likelihood, it quickly snowballed.
2. Ukraine tended to predict the outcomes better than both the West and Russia (understandable). Countries close to Russia/Ukraine also tended to be more accurate (Finland, Baltics, Poland).
3. A lot of expectations were based on performances against much weaker opponents (Russia in Syria, NATO in Lybia).