The authors argue that “Israel has missed a fairly obvious trick, however… in failing to institute the kind of ‘Clear, Hold and Build’ operations that worked so well when employed by the US-led coalition forces during the ‘surge’ in Iraq.” These operations, presented with a diagram in the linked article, were arguably “ultimately far more effective than the present Israeli policy in Gaza of encouraging the local population to leave an area before it is flattened and then fought over, only to have the Israelis depart and[ allow Hamas to come back](https://www.thetimes.com/article/israel-renews-fighting-gaza-shejaiya-district-hamas-9w6w5jkfz).”
At the same time, Petraeus and Roberts note that the presence of hostages in this conflict complicates the Israeli response, and marks a difference between this war and those the US fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. As they write, “Every decision taken by Israel’s government and military has had to be taken through the prism of the hostage situation — that did not tend to be the case in earlier conflicts.”
Do you agree with Roberts and Petraeus that “Israel has yet to succeed” given the ongoing presence of Hamas forces at some level in Gaza?
Indeed, with the recent successful elimination of most of Hezbollah’s chain of command on the northern front, might Israel be closer to success than the authors indicate in this piece?
>Where Israel has missed a fairly obvious trick, however, is in failing to institute the kind of “Clear, Hold and Build” operations that worked so well when employed by the US-led coalition forces during the “surge” in Iraq.
Bro… what. I think Patreus has missed the obvious problem here is that Israel has no interest in “nation building” like we did in Iraq. On top of that, we screwed up by disbanding the Baathist military folk who we could have transitioned Iraq over to, whereas Hamas is not a viable transition “partner.” They are targets. If the Arab nations want to figure out how to keep Gaza in peace, that’s on them. Israel is done with that path.
Ah, the ‘surge’ and the ‘arab awakening’. That has bough a lot of speaking engagements for Mr. Patreus. One would be forgiven for forgetting what happened to the Sunni trangle, Iraq, and the region in subsequent years. By then, Patreus had left to work his magic in Afghanistan, and on to the CIA. What I fear, is the overwhelming evidence that the US has not learned from our collective GWOT experiences, and that the/a think tank chock full of its architects and advocates might not be the beacon of enlightenment for these topics.
Israel certainly could be doing a lot of things better but I don’t think what the US did in Iraq should serve as any kind of model…
I’ve mostly been on side with Petraeus recently in regard to support for Ukraine, but this ‘advice’ is almost comically tone deaf. I could fully believe this is a satire piece if it was presented as such.
5 comments
Retired General David Petraeus and military historian Andrew Roberts, coauthors of the 2023 book [Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/conflict-david-petraeusandrew-roberts?variant=41467744092194), assess Israel’s ground campaign in Gaza in the light of the US-led wars in Iraq.
The authors argue that “Israel has missed a fairly obvious trick, however… in failing to institute the kind of ‘Clear, Hold and Build’ operations that worked so well when employed by the US-led coalition forces during the ‘surge’ in Iraq.” These operations, presented with a diagram in the linked article, were arguably “ultimately far more effective than the present Israeli policy in Gaza of encouraging the local population to leave an area before it is flattened and then fought over, only to have the Israelis depart and[ allow Hamas to come back](https://www.thetimes.com/article/israel-renews-fighting-gaza-shejaiya-district-hamas-9w6w5jkfz).”
At the same time, Petraeus and Roberts note that the presence of hostages in this conflict complicates the Israeli response, and marks a difference between this war and those the US fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. As they write, “Every decision taken by Israel’s government and military has had to be taken through the prism of the hostage situation — that did not tend to be the case in earlier conflicts.”
Do you agree with Roberts and Petraeus that “Israel has yet to succeed” given the ongoing presence of Hamas forces at some level in Gaza?
Indeed, with the recent successful elimination of most of Hezbollah’s chain of command on the northern front, might Israel be closer to success than the authors indicate in this piece?
>Where Israel has missed a fairly obvious trick, however, is in failing to institute the kind of “Clear, Hold and Build” operations that worked so well when employed by the US-led coalition forces during the “surge” in Iraq.
Bro… what. I think Patreus has missed the obvious problem here is that Israel has no interest in “nation building” like we did in Iraq. On top of that, we screwed up by disbanding the Baathist military folk who we could have transitioned Iraq over to, whereas Hamas is not a viable transition “partner.” They are targets. If the Arab nations want to figure out how to keep Gaza in peace, that’s on them. Israel is done with that path.
Ah, the ‘surge’ and the ‘arab awakening’. That has bough a lot of speaking engagements for Mr. Patreus. One would be forgiven for forgetting what happened to the Sunni trangle, Iraq, and the region in subsequent years. By then, Patreus had left to work his magic in Afghanistan, and on to the CIA. What I fear, is the overwhelming evidence that the US has not learned from our collective GWOT experiences, and that the/a think tank chock full of its architects and advocates might not be the beacon of enlightenment for these topics.
Israel certainly could be doing a lot of things better but I don’t think what the US did in Iraq should serve as any kind of model…
I’ve mostly been on side with Petraeus recently in regard to support for Ukraine, but this ‘advice’ is almost comically tone deaf. I could fully believe this is a satire piece if it was presented as such.