It is a standard feature of modern politics that government announcements are preceded by announcements of announcements. The ground must always be prepared. Accordingly, the media has been briefed that this week the United Kingdom and Germany will sign a defence cooperation agreement, part of the government’s stated desire to strengthen its relationship on security with the European Union. We should not expect a revolution so much as an eager scattering of glitter on what is actually relatively humdrum.
John Healey, the defence secretary, visited Berlin in July and agreed a joint declaration on defence with his German counterpart Boris Pistorius. While it was breathlessly billed as ‘the first step in a deep new UK-German defence relationship’ and ‘the most comprehensive defence agreement’ the two countries had ever agreed, it was almost entirely devoid of content. There was not a single concrete policy action contained in it. The jury is out as to whether the government pretends or genuinely believes that well-meaning expressions of principle amount to meaningful action.
The impending agreement between London and Berlin hardly breaks new ground
This week, we have been told to expect an agreement which will enable the UK and Germany to conduct joint military exercises in Nato’s eastern border area and facilitate greater cooperation on procurement and the development of equipment. This, it is hoped, will assist the defence industry in both countries. More broadly, this agreement will represent progress towards a pact with the EU as a whole, with one government source describing it as ‘first steps’. Negotiations on a wider deal could begin in the new year.
There is a certain irony that the official leading the work on the bilateral agreement, who has accompanied the defence secretary to Berlin, is General Gwyn Jenkins. Until June, he was vice-chief of the Defence Staff, and had been chosen in April to succeed Sir Tim Barrow as national security adviser later in the year. In August, however, the prime minister cancelled Jenkins’s appointment and announced that the competition for the post would be re-opened. This was certainly a mistake – and no official reason has ever been given. It is not clear in what official capacity Jenkins is currently acting, but his good will is admirable.
Multinational cooperation on the development and procurement of military equipment is sensible, but it is also a standard part of the defence industrial landscape now. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35B Lightning jets operated by the Royal Air Force are the products of collaboration with other countries, and it is anticipated that the Typhoon will be replaced by the Tempest under the global combat air programme, a trilateral agreement with the UK, Italy and Japan. The RAF’s principal transport aircraft, the A400 Atlas, is made by Airbus, a consortium involving the UK, France, Spain and Germany. The Boxer armoured fighting vehicle which will be used by the British Army’s mechanised infantry regiments began as a Franco-German project which the UK joined then left, and which now also involves the Netherlands. The impending agreement between London and Berlin hardly breaks new ground here.
Joint military exercises are also welcome. Indeed, they are an indispensable part of our defence policy, as Nato remains the foundation of our military posture (despite recent attempts by the EU to secure UK participation in its peacekeeping missions). We have not undertaken significant military action on a unilateral basis since the Falklands conflict in 1982. The steer from the Ministry of Defence is that the agreement with Germany will focus on Estonia and Lithuania, two Nato member states which share a border with Russia. The UK already has a battlegroup deployed to Estonia and announced last week that from July 2025 the army’s 4th Light Brigade would be held at high readiness to reinforce our presence along the alliance’s eastern flank if necessary.
Defending Nato’s eastern border would be conducted on an alliance-wide basis, and there are already regular exercises in the Baltic states in preparation for that. It is not clear why a formal agreement is required for the UK and Germany to hold specific bilateral exercises, nor why they are particularly helpful.
There is unlikely to be anything noxious in the agreement when the final text is published. But it risks missing the point. The main challenges facing Nato are twofold. Its European members have chronically underspent on defence: it has taken 20 years to get two-thirds of the alliance to meet the target of a minimum of 2 per cent of GDP, with Germany only reaching that level this year. There is also the risk of the United States reducing its commitment to the alliance if Donald Trump becomes president again in several weeks’ time. Those problems require urgent attention. Signing grandiloquent declarations which reiterate much of what we already do is simply a distraction.