Moldova Loosens Russia’s Grip – CEPA

Russian disappointment at Moldova’s dual votes for the presidency and the enshrining of European Union (EU) membership in the constitution was palpable. And — given the amount of money and effort invested in corrupting the balloting — quite gratifying.

Even so, it was only by the slimmest of margins that Moldova officially adopted EU accession as a constitutional goal. The referendum, won by 0.8%, occurred in conjunction with a presidential vote which saw the pro-EU incumbent Maia Sandu secure the highest vote total by 16% points but fall short of a majority. A runoff is scheduled for November 3.

Russian interference was extensive and expensive. Moldovan Customs said it began intercepting money mules carrying wads of euros as early as May. It also involved a plot to buy 130,000 votes through $15m of payments directly to bank accounts in September alone, the government said.

Russian leaders and media heralded the narrow win for the EU vote and the failure of Sandu to secure an outright majority as proof of Moldova’s resistance to leaving Moscow’s orbit. But this badly misinterprets the results, which were largely the product of economic hardship, itself a consequence of Russian aggression.

Russia made every effort to defeat the EU referendum and install socialist Alexandr Stoianoglu as president. Russian intelligence plotted to foment civil unrest in case of defeat for their candidate. According to the authorities, the exiled, fugitive oligarch and Russian golden boy Ilan Șor spearheaded the Kremlin-funded.

A Moldovan investigative journalism team uncovered Șor‘s organization offering up to $140 per vote — roughly equivalent to a week’s average salary. The total number of votes bought through this scheme and others may come close to 300,000, according to Sandu.

But Russia, as always, portrayed itself as the victim. Unable to guarantee the security of polling places in Russia, Moldova was forced to reduce the number of voting stations for emigres there from 17 to two. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova declared this “anti-democratic” and “totalitarian.” The order of voting district declarations, reporting Euroskeptical rural districts first and pro-Europe Chisinau and diaspora stations last, led one prominent Russian analyst to claim “obvious” ballot stuffing. Russian media amplified claims by Alexander Muravsky, a low-level minister in a previous Moldovan cabinet, of widespread fraud.

Many of the same analysts who smeared the vote’s legitimacy also lauded its results as proof that Moldova was rejecting the West.

The results are in many ways a consequence of Russian policy, but certainly not of Moldova’s approval of those policies. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine threw Moldova into deep turmoil. Trade with Russia and Ukraine, two of its biggest partners, slowed to a trickle, while the country accepted a massive influx of Ukrainian refugees. The disruptions sent inflation rocketing to 30% annually.

The crisis convinced Sandu to wean Moldova from Russian energy  — Gazprom had jacked up gas prices earlier to punish the country for voting out the Kremlin’s preferred presidential candidate. Sandu has accomplished the transition but at the expense of causing more short-term economic pain.

Were Moldova already an EU member, the continent’s shared market would have better absorbed these shocks and alleviated the country’s economic distress. But this counterfactual doesn’t undo the reality that, for many Moldovans, rule under the country’s most pro-EU party and president was an era of deep financial hardship. When asked in July about their top concerns, Moldovan voters cited variations of “economic hardship” as three of their top five concerns.

The worst of the economic crisis Russia foisted on Moldova seems over, however, with inflation back down to 5% and GDP growth at a respectable 2.6%, positive signals for the incumbent PAS party.

To maintain unified control until then, Sandu needs only to win over a fifth of those who voted for other candidates. Even so, voters will be asked to judge again in parliamentary elections next year. It won’t be an easy ride.

Ben Dubow is a Non-resident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, which tracks authoritarian influence online. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.