Moldova: A Razor-Thin Win for Europe Over Russia

As Moldova’s October 20 elections unfolded, an old woman was by chance filmed by the BBC asking an observer inside a polling station, “Where do I get paid?”

Followed outside, the woman said she and three friends had been told to expect 1,000 roubles (about $10) for their votes. Unwilling to reveal who she had been instructed to support, the incident offered some backing for Moldovan government statements that Russian interference had affected the nation’s vote lock its EU future into the constitution.

The knife’s edge decision is hardly like to discourage further Russian efforts to derail Moldova’s political trajectory. It’s fair to expect that overt and covert Kremlin projects — Moldova said the Kremlin tried to buy 300,000 votes — will continue or even increase. “We fought fairly in an unfair fight — and we won,” Sandu said, and the European Union (EU) backed her, arguing the country had faced unprecedented interference. Russia claimed vote-rigging.

The referendum, passing by 50.39% to 49.61%, marked a historic moment in Moldova’s protracted struggle to secure a path to Europe. That goal of EU membership should ultimately be enshrined in the constitution. Yet the narrow margin of just over 13,000 votes underscores the fragility of this victory.

It would be foolish to pretend that Moldova is simply a playground for renewed east-west rivalry. There are severe and persistent economic problems which encourage young people to leave the country and leave rural areas in profound poverty, so creating large numbers of disgruntled citizens. The World Bank says Moldova faces structural challenges including low productivity growth, governance deficiencies, a large state footprint, limited competition, an imbalanced business environment, and tax distortions. Poverty affects 31% of Moldovans, up from 25% at the start of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine.

Western European aid and (eventually) prosperity have been strong pull factors for countries in Central and Southern Europe to turn toward the EU, and the bloc now seems to recognize this in Moldova.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged €1.8bn [$1.9bn] to support Moldova’s democratic institutions and economy in October, the largest aid package it has received since independence in the 1990s. It’s a significant sum for a country of less than 3 million, and will be used to support economic growth, pre-EU reform and other critical needs like new roads.

But the benefits will take years to arrive and in the meantime Moldova’s young democracy will have to withstand the full weight of Russia’s influence operations. As in Ukraine, the Kremlin appears more afraid of EU membership and the prosperity it brings than any talk of NATO membership.

Not least of the looming challenges will be the November 3 final presidential round of voting. Sandu is well-placed with 42% of votes in the first round, but her pro-Russian rival will receive further support from Moscow, including propaganda back-up.

The nearly 1.5 million valid votes cast on October 20 revealed sharp societal and regional divides.

Urban centers like Chișinău and pro-European regions overwhelmingly supported the amendment, while rural areas and Russian-leaning regions, such as Găgăuzia and the northern districts, strongly opposed it. (Găgăuzia was the site of openly admitted Russian vote-buying of $100 monthly for thousands of citizens, as CEPA reported in April.)

The failure of pro-EU forces to secure broader support can be in part attributed to the government’s over-reliance on its external successes. Sandu’s administration has emphasized Moldova’s growing ties with the EU, showcased by high-profile events like hosting last year’s European Political Community summit, and visits from senior EU officials. However, this strategy did not resonate in rural and less-educated areas, where voters felt disconnected from such diplomatic milestones.

This disconnect was especially evident in regions like Ungheni and Cahul, where EU-funded infrastructure projects were highly visible. While voters in these areas backed Sandu in the presidential race, they rejected the constitutional amendment. The contrast highlights a critical gap in outreach by Sandu’s PAS party to rural communities, where anti-EU sentiment remained strong, fueled in part by the Party of Șor, which maintained vocal support despite legal issues. Șor, a Russia-based fugitive from Moldovan justice, is heavily implicated in the vote-buying campaign, the government says. He denies this.

Another reason behind the weak support for the referendum’s “Yes” vote was the deep-rooted lack of trust within Moldovan society. A lingering Soviet-era mentality, combined with slow-moving reforms — such as much-needed improvements to the justice system — has left citizens disillusioned.

For many, these reforms remain invisible, feeding frustration and skepticism about whether EU integration is truly achievable or merely another political ploy. Disinformation has further eroded confidence, particularly among vulnerable groups, with narratives driven by trusted local figures, including priests, amplifying doubts and resistance to change.

As election experts suggest, interference begins long before Election Day — shaping narratives and disinformation well in advance — added complexity to Moldova’s already fragile democratic processes. A disinformation campaign included not only vote-buying but also cyberattacks aimed at undermining the process.

At the same time, media outlets thoroughly documented voting irregularities, providing authorities with evidence to act. Moldovan institutions now face pressure to address these decisively. The results of the referendum must be validated by the Constitutional Court before being enshrined in the constitution, but Sandu’s government must also prepare for challenges from opponents seeking to delegitimize the outcome.

The possibility of the currently fractured opposition consolidating is also a threat. In the previous election, the third-placed candidate Renato Usatîi urged his supporters to back Sandu in the runoff. This time, he could rally his base to vote for Stoianoglo, posing a significant challenge for Sandu as the vote nears.

In the best-case scenario, a Sandu victory would reaffirm Moldova’s pro-European trajectory and fast-track EU accession talks. A win for Stoianoglo, however, could push the country toward a more cautious, multivector policy, balancing ties with both Brussels and Moscow — likely slowing European integration. And that would be compounded by an opposition victory in next year’s parliamentary elections to be held no later than July.

So while the referendum result is symbolically significant, it offers limited protection against future policy shifts, especially given Moldova’s deep internal divisions.

The country’s path to EU membership is far from guaranteed. The next few months will determine whether Moldova can evade Moscow’s grip or whether it will continue to walk a precarious geopolitical tightrope.

Anda Bologa is an independent expert on AI and digital policy, Central European foreign policy, and transatlantic affairs. She was a Denton Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.