Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, global attention has shifted to securing central Europe against possible Russian aggression and influence. While the majority of that attention has been fixed on countries within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), less attention has been directed to non-NATO countries like Moldova and Georgia. These regions are perhaps even more relevant than NATO countries in a power struggle between the West and Russia because of the breakaway regions they contain. These breakaway regions either claim independence or assert Russian allegiances, and minimal official international recognition jeopardizes their continued autonomy. The autonomous region of Transnistria, located within Moldova, demonstrates a particular sensitivity to Russian influence and has a strong possibility of being Russia’s next target in a post-Russo-Ukrainian War world.
Historical Context
Transnistria’s status as a breakaway republic within Moldova is not new. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a war broke out between Transnistria and what today is Moldova. The conflict ended in 1992, and Transnistria claimed independence from the state of Moldova. Russia supported Transnistria in the war and has had troops stationed there since the conclusion of the war. These Russian forces claim to have two purposes: to act as a peacekeeping group and to protect Soviet weapon deposits located inside Moldova.
In 2006, Transnistria formed its own congress and appealed to Russia for protection from Moldova. This body was convened partially in response to Moldovan and Ukrainian customs reforms in 2005, which Transnistrian authorities opposed. In 2006, 95 percent of Transnistrians expressed in an internationally unrecognized referendum that they wanted to join Russia. The majority of residents in Transnistria also speak Russian as their first language, and almost half have Russian citizenship, along with Moldovan citizenship. Today, about 1,500 Russian troops remain within Transnistria.
The Impact of Russian Military Presence
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian elites have repeatedly called on Moldova to avoid Western influence, referring to the autonomous region as “the next Ukraine.” In the aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion, a key opposition leader in Transnistria was fatally shot, a drone strike destroyed a military helicopter, and there were two explosions in a radio facility near the Ukrainian border. Transnistrian officials alleged that a Ukrainian drone destroyed the helicopter; however, Moldovan officials claimed that the explosion was staged to ignite tensions within the country. The Transnistrian Congress then met for the first time since 2006 to appeal to Moscow for “protection” against the Moldovan government.
While Transnistria seeks incorporation into Russia, Moldova views Ukraine as its first line of defense against Russian aggression. The only way that Russia could engage in a full-scale invasion of Moldova would be securing Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and controlling the city of Odessa. Moldovan foreign minister, Mihai Popsoi, stated that as long as Ukraine held firm with the West’s support, Moldova would remain safe.
The Moldovan government in Chișinău has accused Moscow of interfering in elections and attempting to derail Moldova’s prospects of joining the European Union. As Moldovan president Maia Sandu described in September: “Law enforcement estimates that €50 million was [funneled] into last year’s elections, used to buy off everyone from propagandists to vulnerable voters… As the upcoming presidential election and referendum approach, we anticipate an even larger influx of illicit funds, with estimates suggesting Russia will spend around €100 million on interference into Moldovan democratic processes this year.” Putin, however, has carefully avoided directly talking about Transnistria. He did not reference the breakaway region in his State of the Union address this past February, which occurred the day after the Transnistrian Congress called for protection from Moscow. However, Russia set up polling stations within Transnistria between March 15th and 17th for the Russian presidential election. Russia has similarly held elections in Crimea.
Pressure and the Future of the Region
Leverage is possible for Western interests within Transnistria. The major oligarchs in Transnistria collectively own the Sheriff Corporation—a conglomerate overseeing numerous businesses, including a caviar farm and soccer club—giving them economic incentives to trade with Ukraine and the European Union. However, trade will only become possible once a resolution with the government in Chișinău is agreed upon. Another large problem blocking the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova is a lack of internet freedom in the region. Secessionist authorities’ dominance of the media landscape and restrictions on internet freedom have exacerbated an isolationist and pro-Russian mentality among citizens in the area. Brussels has launched a mission in the country to fight Russian disinformation and help Moldova with its EU bid.
The Russo-Ukrainian War presents an opportunity for the Moldovan government to circumvent one of the major obstacles preventing the reintegration of Transnistria: the cut-rate energy that had been supplied to Moldova from Russia via Transnistria, which received hundreds of millions of euros annually from this energy arrangement. As Moldova applies for EU membership, Brussels has offered to supply energy to Moldova, giving the government in Chișinău more leverage over Transnistria. The Moldovan government could choose to cut off all energy payments to Transnistria to exert pressure on the region to reintegrate. However, this would cause an economic collapse and humanitarian crisis in Transnistria, and the Moldovan government has expressed hesitancy to put so many of its citizens in a precarious position without basic utilities.
According to Ion Marandici, a scholar of Eastern Europe, reintegration is unlikely before 2030, when Moldova hopes to become an EU member. However, integration is still possible as a longer term goal if the Moldovan government is willing to leverage the conflict in Ukraine for EU support and couple a gradual decrease in energy payments to Transnistria with humanitarian outreach to local residents. Integration could ultimately help the Moldovan EU bid because 70 percent of Transnistrian exports are bound for EU countries. Reintegration will be influenced by the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Until the relationship between Transnistria and the official Moldovan government improves, Transnistria will remain a literal and symbolic battlefield between the European Union and Russia.