For North Korea, sending parts of its regular army to russia is essentially trading cannon fodder, for which Pyongyang receives, at minimum, a set of ready-made nuclear technologies.
This refers to solutions in the field of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and submarine-launched missile systems. This was stated by the head of the Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, in an interview with The Economist.
From Defense Express, we note that North Korea obtaining “low-yield tactical nuclear weapons” is not just a very serious threat to South Korea but a catastrophic situation for its security. The fact is, North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. In 2004, it conducted tests of atomic bombs, and in 2017, a thermonuclear weapon. The number of warheads in Pyongyang’s possession is estimated to be around 50. Additionally, North Korea has materials to create up to 70-90 more, with an estimated 60-80 kg of plutonium and 280-1,500 kg of enriched uranium, according to SIPRI estimates.
However, considering North Korea’s actual technological level, we are talking about nuclear warheads that can likely only be mounted on missiles. These do not necessarily need to be of medium or intercontinental range, as the range of the tactical KN-23 is sufficient to cover all of South Korea. It can carry a nuclear warhead since its payload reaches 1,000 kg, and in a specific variant, the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5, it can carry 4.5 tons with a range of 320 km. In this context, miniaturization is not a requirement.
The only logical direction for working on miniaturization technology would be to fit these warheads into artillery shells. This technology has long been developed by the U.S. and the USSR since the 1950s-60s. The Soviet arsenal had a significant number of 152- and 203-mm nuclear artillery shells, as well as 240-mm nuclear mortar rounds.
The Soviet Union developed nuclear shells of 203 mm and 152 mm
At the same time, for North Korea, gaining the ability to produce nuclear artillery shells means turning thousands of their 152-mm and 170-mm howitzers into carriers of weapons of mass destruction. The 170-mm M-1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery system has a range of up to 60 km with an active-reactive shell, which is more than sufficient to strike the center of Seoul from North Korean territory.
The power of such nuclear artillery shells could range from 2-3 kilotons, based on Soviet-era nuclear ammunition, and up to 40 kilotons, considering American examples. The actual power is typically chosen based on the needs of using low-level tactical nuclear weapons, such as for destroying a strongpoint. However, in Pyongyang’s paradigm, the clear objective of nuclear artillery would likely be to strike cities.
The M-1989 Koksan is a type of self-propelled artillery
For South Korea, North Korea gaining such capabilities will be catastrophic. Seoul invests significant resources in finding and destroying ballistic missile launchers, and it has the ability to intercept them. However, in the case of using nuclear artillery shells, counteraction becomes impossible.
It is unrealistic to destroy all of North Korea’s artillery before it starts firing, as there are currently no technologies for mass intercepting artillery shells. Additionally, pushing North Korean artillery back as far as possible into South Korea is not feasible, as breaching the demilitarized zone could take days.