India makes it clear it’s not interested in a Western alliance

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/india-china-canada-u-s-nijjar-pannun-1.7362222

Posted by telephonecompany

18 comments
  1. SS: Evan Dyer, writing for CBC, highlights India’s refusal to align with the West, with Modi’s recent meeting with Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Russia reinforcing New Delhi’s commitment to non-alignment, despite U.S. attempts to woo it into an anti-China coalition. Dyer notes that, although U.S.-India relations have progressed in technology and defense, recent allegations linking Indian officials to dissident murders in North America have strained the relationship. Yet, Washington appears to compartmentalise these issues to preserve its strategic partnership with India. Meanwhile, India’s strong ties with Russia, a crucial arms supplier, bolster its ability to maintain a non-aligned stance amid global tensions. According to Dyer, India’s unique position as a non-aligned power offers a diplomatic advantage, allowing it to balance relationships with rival powers and resist pressures to side with any bloc.

  2. Not surprising at all. India has always had an incredibly consistent policy of non-alignment and strategic autonomy since their independence.

  3. India has a large and still growing expat community in western countries. I wonder how the diaspora will influence this policy in 10-20 years.

  4. India is interested in an any alliance that benefits India. It will proudly trumpet it’s non aligned status while coordinating with the west to contain China and Pakistan, with Russia to acquire energy and commodities at below market, and with China to obtain direct foreign investment.

  5. I would start pulling investment from India ASAP. We are at the point where there are clear lines and repercussions for a states alignment.

  6. This is such a biased article. There is no reason to presuppose that a Canadian outlet would of course publish something of this sort at this point in time. Lets take a look at facts for a change rather than an opinionated article that talks over and over again about an issue that sticks out as a sore thumb to Canada (not all of the West) rather than explaining the “why” part of its ludicrous headlines –

    [https://www.policycircle.org/economy/india-us-trade-challenges/](https://www.policycircle.org/economy/india-us-trade-challenges/)

    [https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-geopolitics-alliances-rethinking-transatlantic-engagement-global-swing-states/india](https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-geopolitics-alliances-rethinking-transatlantic-engagement-global-swing-states/india)

    >The United States is a significant supplier of Indian defense equipment and India’s largest military exercise partner. The two also have bilateral agreements on logistics sharing and cooperate on intelligence, defense technology, and maritime security. 

    [https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/focus-on-india/2680284](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/focus-on-india/2680284)

    # >We want to intensify our strategic partnership with India

    [https://ifrimaps.org/en/french-elections-2022/the-geopolitical-challenges/france-and-india-strengthening-strategic-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific](https://ifrimaps.org/en/french-elections-2022/the-geopolitical-challenges/france-and-india-strengthening-strategic-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific)

    >The relationship has benefited from being rather “discreet,” conducted far from media spotlights. India is widely courted, however, especially now that China is giving such cause for concern

    [https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/bolstering-our-ties-india](https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/bolstering-our-ties-india)

    >The Australia India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, announced in 2020, underpins the relationship, and the connections continue to grow and expand as both countries invest in its future.

    This is the most pro-west India has ever been.

  7. As expected, what did the US expect when they let Putin plunder Ukraine for two years without stopping him?

  8. Indian foreign policy has always been India First. That is unlikely to change any time soon. We can work with that.

  9. India will only be non-aligned for as long as it has the strength to do so.

    As evidenced by the most recent events – when India cannot secure its way, it will acquiesce.

    If India doesn’t want an alliance, it may find itself with no one in its camp later on.

    Being self-interested only goes so far. It does not last forever.

  10. Huge mistake.
    They have a chance to replace China and have companies move all their manufacturing if they were seen as a western ally.
    Their old non alliance game is no longer beneficial but old habits die hard.

  11. Well to be honest, it’s not a bad strategy. Let everyone else shoot each other and hopefully you’re the last one standing and maybe you just ally with the victor to some extent. I’m a little curious on how this will play out in the long run for India.

  12. Westerners need to realize a few things.

    India is a big and ambitious country with a colonial history and a lot of poor population to support, so you cannot expect India to tow in line to the USA like other western allied countries.

    Russia is crucial to India’s security strategy. India has three nuclear states around it. Two of which are hostile to India. India does not need another hostile nuclear state. Asking India to join the west in an alliance against Russia is like asking USA to join in an alliance against Canada. Not gonna happen. India, Russia and China are in a delicate balance of appeasing each other which works for everyone.

    India is not anti west. As long as the west understands India’s constraints in its foreign policy and doesn’t expect India to just give up it’s long term partners for the west, India is willing to be friendly. This is exactly what western leaders are doing, giving India leeway when it comes to Russia and working with India to contain China.

    India’s foreign policy is essentially to be friendly and trade with everyone that is not attacking India’s national integrity. Hence the only countries that do have bad relations with India are Pakistan and China, for obvious reasons, Turkey and Azerbaijan, who support Pakistan on Kashmir, and Canada to a lesser extent, as they give shelter to Khalistanis.

  13. I don’t know anyone in Washington would view India’s attendance of a BRICS summit of which it is a founding member with dismay. It would have raised eyebrows if they didn’t attend. 

  14. It’s only natural for them to see their own benefits. The western expectation of ideological alignment does not benefit India.

  15. India is first and foremost concerned with India, just like all the other powers are first and foremost considered with themselves. At this stage, it has the most to gain from straddling East and West; it gains the economic and security benefits of both. It gains more potential leverage to use against China (and perhaps Pakistan by proxy), helping correct for the current imbalance in power.

    As India’s economic position improves, it will continue to look for new ways to exert its influence. Those activities will immediately increase tensions with China while also putting stress on the Indo-Russian agreements, forcing Russia to choose between India and China (which will probably come down to whether or not it’s going to contest Chinese influence in its “near abroad”). From that point, the West is the only party that can offer them both economic and security benefits. Expats may or may not influence this decision, depending on their relative share of the total “Indian population” at that point.

    But I don’t think it’s likely for India to fully commit to the West like, say, South Korea has. India will probably want to be a great power in its own right and that will likely entail some soft competition with the West, especially the US with its “pivot” towards East Asia. I think we’re probably looking at a UK/France situation where they eventually found common cause in other wars (ironically, Russia and China), which helped accelerate the detente and eventual alliance. But that’s decades out, most likely.

  16. Okay so Indian foreign policy of the past 50 years hasn’t changed. Color me surprised at non-news.

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