Is Europe prepared for the U.S. election outcome?

Earlier this year, we emphasized the need—and increasing urgency—for Europe to improve its defense capabilities and create a degree of independence from the United States. It is not clear what progress NATO, and European member states specifically, have made. While a victory by Donald Trump can be expected to more drastically shift Washington’s efforts away from European defense, even the Biden/Harris administration prioritized reprioritization of the Middle East and a “pivot” toward Asia.

European states do appear to be reprioritizing their collective security and capabilities, particularly as they face a multiplicity of threats and an uncertain future with its U.S. partner. The alliance’s choice for its new secretary general—Mark Rutte, a former prime minister of the Netherlands known for his pragmatic and consensus-driven leadership—suggests that members sought a leader who will not only staunchly back Ukraine, but also bolster its defense in the face of an emboldened Russia. Over the summer, NATO also concluded its largest military exercise since the Cold War, which saw over 90,000 troops engaged, practicing rapid deployment across the Atlantic and Europe. At the NATO Washington Summit in July, member countries pledged to provide long-term support for Ukraine and adopted numerous policies and strategies on pressing issues. Notably, the alliance updated its Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism and NATO leaders also endorsed a revised AI strategy to accelerate the responsible use of AI within the alliance. NATO also announced in August it is working on adopting emerging and disruptive technologies and establishing principles regarding responsible use.

These recent initiatives respond to some of the biggest challenges the alliance faces: Russia’s aggression and hybrid activities, a proliferation of cyber threats from foreign interference to hacking, a rise in violent extremism and terrorism, including far-right and Salafi-jihadism, and the role of emerging technologies in amplifying and compounding many of these issues. However, such progress may not be enough to respond to an uncertain future partnership with the White House, particularly with the potential of a Russia-sympathetic administration, a protracted conflict in the Middle East, or the changing dynamics on the continent itself, such as the rise of far-right parties, many of whom have pro-Russian stances and have sought to shift security priorities. 

The concept of “Trump-proofing” the alliance has been previously discussed, including at the Washington Summit in July, where leaders brainstormed ways to safeguard the alliance and the international security order from potential disruptions resulting from a change in administrations. Yet, in reality, not much can be done to ensure the alliance’s vitality through pre-emptive action. Some NATO allies are reaching out to individuals close to the former president to mitigate risk. Others are pushing for the establishment of a NATO bank, that would support defense spending and safeguard collective security. These efforts mean little without future U.S. support for the transatlantic project. Moreover, the concept of “trump-proofing” itself may be considered antidemocratic and reinforce the skepticism of and distrust in international institutions that is increasingly common among the Western electorate.

While examining the implications for European security strategy and the future of the Alliance under each presidential candidate is important, it’s clear that U.S. priorities will increasingly shift back toward the Middle East as the Israel-Hamas conflict continues and widens, regardless of the election outcome. Resources may also be redirected toward international counterterrorism efforts alongside strategic competition priorities. FBI Director Christopher Wray highlighted earlier this year an unprecedented number of simultaneous threats to the United States, including terrorism from across the ideological spectrum, foreign election interference, espionage, among others. Further, although the much-discussed U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific has yet to fully materialize, it would be shortsighted to ignore the potential for increased U.S. engagement in that region, especially given the strengthening alliance among hostile authoritarian regimes, including Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China. Despite the small victories NATO has achieved in recent months, Europe must not be naïve about its future security and should reconsider its overreliance on the United States.

A Harris administration would likely provide continuity with its predecessor in its policies around NATO and Europe. Although Harris may be less marked by Cold War-era security politics, she has explicitly vowed to continue supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression and building international alliances to safeguard U.S. interests against authoritarian regimes. During her speech to the Democratic National Convention in August, she explicitly stated her administration would stand with NATO allies and Ukraine if she became president, emphasizing this commitment.

That leaders are trying to “Trump-proof” NATO is a testimony to lessons learned during the former president’s tenure. Trump frequently called the alliance obsolete and suggested that U.S. commitment to NATO’s mutual defense clause would depend on whether individual member states met their financial obligations. Nevertheless, the former administration was all bark, no bite: the U.S. did not reduce its military presence in Europe, while Trump participated in diplomatic engagements with NATO leaders albeit with a more transactional and finance-oriented focus. His presidency, when looked at in terms of European spending on defense, was in some respects a relative success, seemingly catalyzing increased investment by the Europeans in their own defense.

With a picture emerging of what a second Trump administration’s potential NATO policy would look like, all signs point to the former president remaining NATO-skeptical, with an increasingly transactional policy toward the continent. This could perhaps be a positive development for accelerating European Strategic Autonomy, were it not coupled with Trump’s propensity to side with Russia. Trump is considering cutting back on intelligence-sharing with European NATO member states. Without the full weight of the U.S. intelligence apparatus, Europe’s situational awareness on Russia—and its ability to counter ever-increasing Russian aggression and interference on European soil—is bound to decrease drastically. Moreover, Trump has stated he could resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in a day, implying a settlement rather than the full restoration of Ukraine’s borders. At a February rally in South Carolina, Trump said he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member country that doesn’t meet spending guidelines on defense. Former President Trump has also allegedly continued conversations with President Vladimir Putin after he left office, including one conversation where Trump discouraged U.S. military aid for Ukraine, according to journalist Bob Woodward. If true, coupled with Trump’s public statements on Russia and European alliances, a bleak picture emerges for the future of NATO. While it seems that the United States would not exit the Alliance, it could potentially become a quid-pro-quo driven organization, severely tarnished by perceived sympathy for Russia by its primary benefactor. 

The outcome of the U.S. presidential election will not only affect NATO and European defense more broadly, but also serve to fuse with and embolden forces currently at work on the continent itself. The rise of far-right populist parties in Europe—that are often both Euroskeptic and pro-Russian—has translated into notable electoral successes in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France, among others. These leaders represent a growing faction within the European Parliament—particularly among Central European populists—that have advocated for decreasing support for Ukraine and aligning more closely with Russian interests. Not only could a Trump presidency strengthen these groups, and vice versa, at the national and the EU levels, but also weaken the Alliance and other security institutions, particularly in the face of an emboldened Russia.

Although Russia’s largely successful influence over the European far-right has been demonstrated, the increasing convergence of the continent’s far-right and far-left populist forces means that the threat to European security does not cut neatly across ideological lines, as seen in joint protests in the Czech Republic. Slovakia’s left-wing, pro-Russian Prime Minister Robert Fico—who pledged earlier this month he will “never agree to Ukraine joining NATO”—is also an apt example. As these parties continue to capitalize on the war in Ukraine, energy prices, and the cost-of-living crisis, coupled with institutional grievances amongst some in the European electorate, a Trump administration could potentially strengthen the hand of these parties and substantially shift European security priorities, weakening the continent’s ability to defend itself against foreign interference and aggression.

The impact of U.S. leadership on European security is far more nuanced than a simple good-bad dichotomy. While it is clear that Trump’s pro-Russian inclinations would wreak significant havoc on the Alliance, European security cannot be tied to the health of NATO regardless of who will be in charge across the Atlantic. The United States currently has its eyes re-fixed on the Middle East, and as the war shows no signs of abating and a ceasefire seemingly out of reach, expecting a Harris Administration to fully hedge Europe’s security and future is naive at best. As rising European populist forces demonstrate, failing to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy and defenses will likely weaken its overall security regardless of who occupies the White House. The German newspaper Die Welt recently examined NATO’s updated military plans and discovered a significant increase in demands placed on member states since 2022. In addition to calling for an increase in the number of troops ready to fight against a Russia, NATO military leaders are urging for a rapid increase in anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense capabilities. Playtime is over; it’s time to view NATO as a complement rather than the backbone of a robust European security apparatus.